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INTRODUCTION

In June 1994, a firestorm of public controversy flared when the
Minnesota Supreme Court found there was insufficient evidence to
civilly commit two convicted sex offenders, Dennis Linehan and Peter
Rickmyer, under the state's psychopathic personality statute.' Fueled

1. See generally Robert Whereatt, Specter of Freed Sex PredatorsWorries Officials, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis),July 7, 1994, at BI (discussing Governor's, Attorney General's, and
Department of Human Services' efforts to block sexual psychopaths' petitions for
release in wake of court's decisions); PanelBlasts CourtDecision to Free Sex Offenders, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 15, 1994, at B5 (reporting reactions to court's decisions by
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by the public's escalating fear of violent crime 2 and the customary
sound and fury of an election year,' the debate engaged Minnesota's
Legislature and Governor, who passed and signed, respectively, an
expanded statute4 intended to keep more convicted sex offenders
under lock and key beyond their scheduled release from prison.'
When passed in 1939, Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute
was used to divert "sexual deviates" 6 into treatment rather than
prison.7 During the last four years, however, the statute has been
utilized in effect to extend the sentences of convicted sex offenders
indefinitely by committing them to a security hospital.'
While
retaining the commitment process for "sexual psychopathic personalities," the legislature's recent action seems calculated to broaden the
statute's reach even further, by adding a second category, the "sexually
dangerous person" classification, which imposes a less onerous burden
upon prosecutors seeking civil commitment.9 Whether the newly
expanded statute will result in more commitments of soon-to-bereleased sex offenders or fall to constitutional challenges remains to be
seen.
This Comment examines the evolution of the psychopathic
personality statute and analyzes the recent enactment authorizing the
civil commitment of "sexually dangerous persons." The history of the
commitment of sex offenders is traced in Part II. Part III assesses the
changes made to the statute in the special legislative session and

members of legislative task force on sexual predators); Mimi Hall, A FurorBrews over
Release of Sex Offenders, USA TODAY, Aug. 17, 1994, at A3 (describing public anger
nationwide over crimes committed by previously convicted sex offenders and reporting
legislative efforts to address such situations).
2. In early 1994, 29% of those responding to a statewide poll identified crime as
"the biggest problem in the state." MinnesotansOptimistic About Future:53% Surveyed Say
They Believe State Is on Right Track, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 2, 1994, at C4. This
represented a dramatic shift in public opinion: "In December 1985... less than [one]
percent of the respondents listed crime as their top concern. In June 1988 and May
1990, only [two] percent of Minnesotans cited crime." Id.
3. In November 1994, Many local elections included a race for county attorney,
the person who ordinarily brings a petition to commit individuals under the
psychopathic personality statute. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text
(describing county attorney's role).
4. See MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.02, .18, .185 (1994).
5. See infra part IILA (discussing Minnesota's new sexually dangerous person
statute).
6. See infra note 54.
7. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545,
550, 287 N.W. 297, 300 (1939), affd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); see also infra part II.A.
8.

PROGRAM EvALUATION DIv., OFFICE OF THE LEGisLATIvE AUDITOR, STATE OF

MINN., PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONAIiTY COMMITMENT LAW 17 (1994)
[hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT]; see also infra part II.C. 1.
9. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (1994); see also infra parts IIIA, IV.
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discusses the first constitutional challenge made to the new provision
for commitment of sexually dangerous persons. In Part IV, this
Comment asserts that the sexually dangerous persons commitment
statute represents an inefficient use of public resources and offends
fundamental principles of due process and equal protection.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The OriginalStatute

Beginning in 1937, state legislatures enacted statutes that utilized
civil commitment proceedings to commit "sexual psychopaths"' ° to
treatment programs." By 1970, twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia had enacted such "sexual psychopath" or "mentally
disordered sex offender" statutes.'"

10. "States have defined a sexual psychopath as one who is predisposed to the
commission of sex crimes and who is dangerous to society." Carol Veneziano & Louis
Veneziano, An Analysis of Legal Trends in the Disposition of Sex Crimes: Implications for
Theoy, Research, and Policy, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 206 (1987).
The term
"psychopathic personality," however, was expunged from the psychiatric nomenclature
in 1952. HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY 11 (5th ed. 1988) (citing AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(1952)). Cleckley suggests that the modern-day equivalent of the sexual psychopath is
classified under the heading of "personality disorders." Id. at 287. But see infra notes
293-97 and accompanying text.
11. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. Michigan was the first state
to enact a sexual psychopath statute in 1937, followed closely by Illinois. Id.
12. Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 10, at 206. Most states, however, have
repealed their sexual psychopath commitment laws in the past 20 years. LEGISLATIVE
AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 4. The repeals have been undertaken because of
the general belief in the mental health field that treatment is ineffectual; because
predictions of dangerousness and diagnoses of sexual psychopathologies are unreliable;
because the general public has expressed a preference for punishment over treatment;
and, at least in part, because of the high cost of defending against legal challenges to
the statutes. Id.
In addition to Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute, such Pearson-erasex
offender commitment statutes are retained by just nine other states and the District of
Columbia. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-566 to -567 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 22-3503 to -3511 (1981 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, paras. 205/0.01 to
/12 (Smith-Hurd 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1-9 (West 1986 & Supp.
1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2911 to -2921 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to -8
(West 1995); OR.REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 426.510-.680 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-6-301 to -306 (1984 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to -5 (1995); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-300 to -302 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.06.005-. 140
(West 1992). Minnesota, however, appears to be the only state that regularly has
utilized its old statute. Rorie Sherman, PsychiatricGulag or Wse Safekeeping? Lawmakers
Use Civil Commitment to Detain Sex Predators,NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 5, 1994, at Al.
Although these older commitment laws seem to have fallen into disfavor, a growing
number of states have considered or passed legislation similar to Minnesota's sexually
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In enacting these measures, legislators were operating under several
assumptions.' First, it was thought that the "sexual psychopath" had
a specific, treatable mental disability."4
Second, treatment was
believed to be appropriately within the realm of mental health
professionals. 5 Third, it was assumed that treatment usually would
be successful.' 6 Lastly, legislators hypothesized that those who were
treated would be less likely to reoffend and, accordingly, the public
would be protected.' 7
In 1939, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a psychopathic personality statute'" which, although recently expanded, 9 remains largely
intact to this day.20 The legislature acted upon the recommendations
of a committee appointed by the governor "to consider the problem

dangerous persons commitment statute. See infra note 229 and accompanying text
(listing recently-enacted state statutes and bills considered but not passed by state
legislatures). As discussed infra, the classification of "sexually dangerous persons" is a
new, broader category of civil commitment under which convicted sex offenders may
be detained beyond their scheduled release date from prison. See infra part III.A.; see
also MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (1994) (defining "sexually dangerous person").
In contrast to the old laws, which were intended to divert offenders into treatment
instead of prison, see infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text, these new commitment
statutes generally are meant to divert convicted offenders into mental health
institutions, rather than into society, at the conclusion of their sentences, see infra note
229.
13. SeeWilliam D. Erickson, The Psychopathic Personality Statute, Need for Change
12-13 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).
Dr. Erickson notes:
The psychopathic personality commitment law was passed at a time of great
ignorance about sexual behavior, before the Kinsey report and long before
any strategies were developed or tested for the treatment of sexual misbehavior. The term "psychopathic personality" . . . is a nineteenth century term
relating to the concept of moral insanity, the notion that the will might be
defective where the mind was not.
Id. at 16.
14. Id. at 12. In the era in which most of these statutes were passed, civil
commitment proceedings were motivated by "a paternalistic concern for persons
perceived to be 'in need of treatment.'" John Monahan & HenryJ. Steadman, Toward
a Rejuvenation of Risk Assessment Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER:
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 1, 1 (John Monahan & HenryJ. Steadman eds.,

1994). In the late 1960s, however, the patients' rights movement emerged, and the
public policy emphasis shifted from a desire to provide the mentally ill with treatment
to an effort to protect others from the risk of harmful behavior. Id.
15. Erickson, supra note 13, at 12.
16. Id.
17.

Id. at 12-13.

18. Act approved Apr. 21, 1939, ch. 369, 1939 Minn. Laws 712.
19. See infra part III.A.
20. CompareMINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (1994) with Act approved Apr. 21,
1939, ch. 369, § 1, 1939 Minn. Laws 712, 712.
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of the insane criminal with special reference to sex criminals.""'
The legislature drew heavily upon the committee's report in drafting
the main portion of the act," which defined "psychopathic personality" as
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional
instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary
standards of goodjudgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render
such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual
matters and thereby dangerous to other persons."3
Within months of the statute's enactment, the state supreme court was
confronted with an application for a writ of prohibition challenging
the law's constitutionality.
B.

State ex rel. Pearson
1.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

In April 1939, a petition was filed in Ramsey County Probate Court
seeking commitment of Charles Edwin Pearson as a psychopathic
personality.24 Pearson subsequently sought a writ prohibiting the

21. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON THE CARE OF INSANE CRIMINALS
AND SEX CRIMES, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE FIFTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, at 1393 (1939) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON
THE CARE OF INSANE CRIMINALS]. In his letter introducing the committee's report,
Governor Harold Stassen noted "the unsatisfactory and ineffective manner" in which
cases involving "insane and sex criminals" were being handled at the time. LETTER
FROM GovERNOR HAROLD E. STASSEN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (APR. 4, 1939), JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE
FIFTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, at 1392-93
(1939).
22. The legislature crafted the definition more narrowly than had the committee,
which proposed that the act reach anyone "socially or morally irresponsible, sexually or
otherwise." COMMITTEE ON THE CARE OF INSANE CRIMINALS, supra note 21, at 1394.
Acknowledging that "the grant of powers proposed is considerable," the committee
nonetheless maintained that the definition it proposed was narrow enough to provide
"adequate protection to the citizen against persecution through arbitrary acts of
incompetent or unfriendly officials." Id. at 1395-96.
23. Act approved Apr. 21, 1939, ch. 369, § 1, 1939 Minn. Laws 712, 712. The
legislature recently amended the statutory definition. See infra note 234 (providing
current statutory definition of psychopathic personality as codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.02, subd. 18a (1994)).
24. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 546,
287 N.W. 297, 298 (1939), afid, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). The precise nature of Mr.
Pearson's "deviance" is not revealed in the court's opinion. However, it is noteworthy
that he was released within one year of commitment-even before the United States
Supreme Court rendered its opinion in the case. Erickson, supra note 13, at 10; see also
infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (describing behaviors prompting commitment
during the statute's early years).
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probate court from proceeding with a commitment hearing.25
In his petition to the supreme court, Pearson attacked the statute's
constitutionality on four fronts. 26 First, he contended that the law
violated a state constitutional provision defining and limiting the
jurisdiction of probate courts." Second, he argued that the statute
encompassed more than one subject, which rendered it void under the
state constitution. 8 More importantly, however, Pearson maintained
that under the United States Constitution, the law (1) was prohibitively
vague and (2) violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses.2 9
30
Pearson's first two contentions were found to be without merit.
However, the federal constitutional arguments warrant closer examination.
In addressing Pearson's assertion that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, the supreme court found that the law adequately reflected
the legislature's intentions. 31 The court stated that "[i]n the interest

25. Pearson, 205 Minn. at 546, 287 N.W. at 298.
26. Id. at 547, 287 N.W. at 298-99.
27. Id. at 547-50, 287 N.W. at 299-800. At the time, the Minnesota Constitution
stated that "[a] probate court shall have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased
persons and persons under guardianship, but no otherjurisdiction, except as prescribed
by this Constitution." MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 7 (Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927). The current
analogue to this section expands the probate courts' jurisdiction to include "all
guardianship and incompetency proceedings" and does not contain the proscriptive
language of the earlier version. MINN. CONsT. art. VI, § 11.
28. Pearson,205 Minn. at 550-54, 287 N.W. at 300-02. The Minnesota Constitution
states that "[n]o law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in
its title." MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 27 (Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927) (current version at
MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 17).
29. Pearson,205 Minn. at 554-57, 287 N.W. at 302-03.
30. Id. at 550, 554, 287 N.W. at 300, 302. As to the first point, the court found that
the plain language of the constitution limited the probate courts' jurisdiction to
"'estates of deceased persons and persons under guardianship.'" Id. at 548, 287 N.W.
at 299 (quoting MINN. CONsr. art. 6, § 7 (1927)). The court relied on an earlier
decision in which it held that "the putting under guardianship of all persons who are
proper subjects for it-insane persons, incorrigible drunkards, idiots, spendthrifts, as
well as minors-comes within the jurisdiction of the probate court." Id. (citing State
ex re. Chesley v. Wilcox, 24 Minn. 143 (1877)). The court concluded that psychopathic
personalities similarly were "persons subject to guardianship," as determined by the
legislature pursuant to its grant of power. Id. at 548-50, 287 N.W. at 299-300.
Pearson's second ground for appeal rested on the statute's title, "A bill for an act
relating to persons having a psychopathic personality," which Pearson maintained "[did]
not fairly express the subject of the act." Id. at 550-51, 287 N.W. at 300. In rejecting
Pearson's argument, the court, construing the constitutional provision liberally, found
that "[a] title broader than the statute, if it is fairly indicative of what is included in it,
does not offend the constitution. ...
[T]he title indicates that the act deals with
persons of abnormal minds . .. ." Id. at 551-53, 287 N.W. at 300-01.
31. Id. at 554-55, 287 N.W. at 302.
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of humanity and for the protection of the public, persons so afflicted
should be given treatment and confined for that purpose rather than
for the purpose of punishment." 2
However, conceding that the statutory language was somewhat
flawed, the court construed the definition of psychopathic personalities"3
to include those persons who, [ (1)] by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, [(2)] have evidenced an utter lack of power
to control their sexual impulses and who, [(3)] as a result, are likely
to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the
objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.'
Known as the Pearson standard, 5 the court's three-pronged test
usually has been considered together with the statutory definition of
psychopathic personality 6 to determine whether civil commitment is
warranted. 7
Pearson's final argument was that the statute violated equal
protection, since it did not apply to all individuals who committed
sexual misconduct, and due process, because the law did not permit
3
ajury trial or "certain other rights" guaranteed criminal defendants. 1
In the court's view, while it would be unreasonable and probably
unconstitutional to apply the statute to every person guilty of sexual
misconduct, it was reasonable to apply it to "sexually irresponsible
persons" who posed a danger to others.3 9 Furthermore, the court
held that the constitutional right to trial by jury does not apply to
proceedings of this civil nature, although "persons cannot be adjudged

32. Id. at 550, 287 N.W. at 300.
33. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (providing original statutory definition

of psychopathic personality).
34. Pearson,205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302.
35. See, e.g., In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1994) ("The state has failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellant meets the Pearson standard
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for original statutory definition of
psychopathic personality. The legislature recently amended this definition to include
the Pearson construction. See infra note 234 (providing new statutory definition as
codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (1994)).
37. E.g., In reBuckhalton, 503 N.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (applying
the statute's definition of a psychopathic personality as "narrowed" by the supreme
court in Pearson), af'fd 518 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 1994). It should be noted, however,
that some individuals have been committed solely on the basis of the statutory
definition. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
38. Pearson,205 Minn. at 555-57, 287 N.W. at 302-03. The court did not elaborate
what the "certain other rights" were. Id. at 556, 287 N.W. at 303. Had Pearson's
commitment proceeded, his "jury"would have consisted of an attorney, the judge, and
an examining doctor. Erickson, supra note 13, at 14-15 n.8.
39. Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555-56, 287 N.W. at 302-03.
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insane and committed without notice and an opportunity to be
heard."4"
The supreme court quashed Pearson's petition for a writ of
prohibition, holding the psychopathic personality statute to be
Subsequently committed under the
constitutional on its face.4 '
statute, Pearson appealed, and the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.
2.

The United States Supreme Court Decision

On appeal, the Supreme Court considered Pearson's contention that
the psychopathic personality statute was unconstitutionally vague and
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 The Court rejected both arguments.
According to the Court, the statutory construction developed by the
state supreme court "destroy[ed] the contention that it is too vague
and indefinite to constitute valid legislation." 43 Therefore, Pearson's
found to be unwarranted in light
vagueness attack upon the statute was
44
of the state court's interpretation.
The Court next turned its attention to the Fourteenth Amendment
issues. Pearson maintained that the statute denied equal protection of
the laws because it treated one group, sexual psychopaths, differently
than the larger class of "insane persons."45 The Court dismissed the
argument in short order:
[TIhe legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may
confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is
deemed to be clearest. If the law "presumably hits the evil where it
there are other
is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because
46
instances to which it might have been applied."
The Court then considered the issue of due process. After a
recitation of the steps involved in the commitment process,47 the

40. Id. at 556-57, 287 N.W. at 303.
41. Id. at 557, 287 N.W. at 303.
42. Minnesota ex reL Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 272
(1940).
43. Id. at 274. The Court enumerated the requirements created by the state court's
construction and concluded, "These underlying conditions, calling for evidence of past
conduct pointing to probable consequences are as susceptible of proof as many of the
criteria constantly applied in prosecutions for crime." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 275 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79
(1912)).
47. The Court noted such procedural safeguards as the provision for hearing and
examination, the defendant's rights to counsel and to compel production of witnesses,
and examination by two medical doctors. Id. at 276-77.
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Court held that the applicable statutes were not obviously defective in
any material way and should not be construed, prior to the state
court's review of an actual commitment proceeding, 48 as to deprive
Pearson of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.49 With
the constitutional issues apparently resolved,5" implementation of the
statute began.
C.

Application of the Statute, 1939-1994
1.

The Statistics

From 1939 to 1990 an estimated 250 individuals were
under Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute.5 In
years immediately following enactment, the statute was
frequency, but the number of such commitments declined
1960s and remained low through 1990.52

committed
the twenty
used with
during the

48. At the time the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion, Pearson's
petition for a writ of prohibition (seeking to block the commitment proceeding) was
the only case under the psychopathic personality statute that had been considered by
the state supreme court. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
49. Pearson, 309 U.S. at 277 (calling Pearson's objections "premature").
50. Pearson was the first case in which the Court considered and upheld the
constitutionality of a state statute providing for the civil commitment of "sexual
psychopaths." LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. Constitutional
challenges to such laws-and civil commitment statutes in general-have rested on
grounds of fight to a jury trial, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, right to treatment,
violation of equal protection, fight against self-incrimination, and violation of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause. See, e.g., McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S.
245 (1972) (holding that a person who refuses to cooperate in psychiatric evaluation
cannot be held indefinitely);Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (finding that equal
protection is offended where a state indefinitely confines an individual found
incompetent to stand trial, when a less stringent standard of release is applied to those
committed as mentally ill); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (holding that states
requiring trial by jury in other types of civil commitment proceedings must do so for
sexual psychopath commitments, absent a compelling justification); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970) (applying criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to civil
proceedings seeking to commit a juvenile); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)
(guaranteeing person sought to be committed the rights to counsel, notice and the
opportunity to be heard, confrontation and cross-examination, and appeal).
The United States Supreme Court consistently has upheld psychopathic personality
statutes, resting its rationale on the civil nature of the proceedings, as well as upon the
state's police and parenspatriaepowers. See generally Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note
10, at 207-15 (summarizing decisions in which the constitutionality of sexual psychopath
statutes was challenged).
51. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 11 (attributing data to staff at
the Minnesota Security Hospital).
52. Id. (citing Erickson, supra note 13, at 4, 20-21, and data from the Departments
of Corrections and Human Services, various district courts, and county attorneys). Only
13 people were committed as psychopathic personalities during the 1970s, 14 were
committed during the 1980s, and two were committed in 1990. Id.
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Minnesota's statute, like similar laws enacted across the nation,"
appears to have been originally intended to divert sexual "deviates""
into treatment rather than prison.55 In fact, most of those committed
during the 1940s and early to mid-1950s were first-time offenders-from window peepers to "flashers" to gay men engaging in
consensual sex-who were committed for a year or less in lieu of
imprisonment.5 6 Even as more violent offenders were committed in
the late 1950s and 1960s, civil commitment tended to serve as a brief
period of psychiatric observation preceding criminal prosecution and
sentencing. 7 Not until the 1970s were commitment proceedings
increasingly instituted
against violent repeat sex offenders, though still
58
on a limited basis.
In the spring of 1988 several highly publicized, barbarous
rape/murders were committed by men who recently had been released
from prison after serving time for criminal sexual conduct.59 The
Minnesota Attorney General quickly convened a task force to study
sexual violence against women.6" The task force recommended, in
part, that the legislature increase the length of determinate sentences

53. See supranotes 11-12 and accompanying text.
54. At the time the Minnesota statute was enacted, the term "sexual psychopath"
commonly was used to describe gays and lesbians, transsexuals, masochists and sadists,
voyeurs and exhibitionists, pedophiles, and other "deviates." CLECKLEY, supra note 10,
at 286.
55. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. In Pearson, the Minnesota
Supreme Court also alluded to this objective of treatment rather than punishment:
"[T] he public welfare requires that [psychopathic personalities] be treated before they
have opportunity to injure others...." State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey
County, 205 Minn. 545, 556, 287 N.W. 297, 303 (1939), affd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); see
infta part IV.A.
56. Erickson, supranote 13, at 19-20, 23-25; see, e.g., Dittrich v. Brown County, 215
Minn. 234, 236, 9 N.W.2d 510, 512 (1943). The court characterized Mr. Dittrich as
"mentally bright, capable, and a good worker" but "emotionally unstable with respect
to sexual matters." Id. at 235, 9 N.W.2d at 511-12. His "uncontrollable craving for
sexual intercourse and self-abuse by masturbation" allegedly impaired his wife's health.
Id. According to staff at the Minnesota Security Hospital, Dittrich's wife instigated the
proceedings against her husband, complaining that he masturbated "excessively."
Erickson, supra note 13, at 24.
57. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
58. Erickson, supra note 13, at 26; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
59. Nineteen-year-old Carrie Coonrod was raped and stabbed to death in a
downtown Minneapolis parking ramp on May 27, 1988. Just 16 days later, 34-year-old
Mary Foley was raped and strangled as she walked to her car in her employer's parking
ramp. Both were killed by convicted sex offenders. Norman Draper, Slayings in Ramps
Prompted Changes in Sentencing, Security Tighter,STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 12, 1989,
at Al; see alsoVirginia Rybin, Stiffer Sentences Urged at Hearing,SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS
DISPATCH, Dec. 9, 1988, at Cl.
60. Julie A. Hoffman, Humphrey Asks Tougher Sentences for Rapists, SAINT PAUL
PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, June 27, 1988, at AS.
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given dangerous sex offenders (or, preferably, reinstitute indeterminate
sentencing) and that the psychopathic personality statute be used
to confine especially violent offenders beyond their prison
aggressively
6
terms. '

The 1989 legislature subsequently passed several measures aimed at
keeping violent sex offenders off the streets. 62 First, the courts were

directed to consider the suitability of psychopathic personality
commitment at the time of initial sentencing, a strategy known as "dual
commitment." 63 Second, determinate statutory maximum sentences
for criminal sexual conduct were increased.' 4 And third, a "patterned
sex offender" sentencing statute was passed, authorizing longer
sentences for those who were deemed to be likely to reoffend if not
treated. 65 These measures became law in August 1989.66

61. Cheryl Heilman & Kathy M. Hebert, Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators:
Minnesota's Psychopathic PersonalityStatute, HENNEPIN LAW., SepL-Oct. 1993, at 4 (citing
FINAL REPORT, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 10-14, 22-23 (1989)).
62. See Jim Parsons, Legislators Debate Life Sentence for Viwlent, Repeat Sex Offenders,

STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 16, 1989, at B7.
63. The statute encouraging "dual commitment" reads:
When a court sentences a person under section 609.1352 [sentencing of
patterned sex offenders], 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, or 609.345 [first-, second-, third-, or fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, respectively], the
court shall make a preliminary determination whether in the court's opinion
a [commitment] petition ...may be appropriate and include the determination as part of the sentencing order. If the ...petition may be appropriate,
the court shall forward its preliminary determination along with supporting
documentation to the county attorney.
MINN. STAT. § 609.1351 (1994).
64. Maximum sentences and fines for convictions of criminal sexual conduct were
increased from 20 to 25 years and from $35,000 to $40,000 for first-degree offenses, Act
of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 4, § 12, 1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1622 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 609.342, subd. 2 (1994)); from 15 to 20 years and from $30,000 to
$35,000 for offenses in the second degree, Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 4, § 13,
1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1622 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.343, subd. 2 (1994));
from 10 to 15 years and from $20,000 to $30,000 for third-degree offenses, Act ofJune
1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 4, § 14, 1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1622 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 609.344, subd. 2 (1994)); and from five to 10 years and from $10,000 to $20,000
for offenses in the fourth degree, Act ofJune 1, 1989, ch. 290, arL 4, § 15, 1989 Minn.
Laws 1580, 1623 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.345, subd. 2 (1994)).
In addition, the legislature created an exception to statutory maximum sentences
by mandating a 37-year sentence for any offender convicted of first- or second-degree
criminal sexual conduct, who also had two previous convictions for first-, second-, or
third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Act ofJune 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 2, § 14, 1989
Minn. Laws 1580, 1593 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.346, subd. 2a (1994)).
65. Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 4, § 10, 1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1620-21
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.1352 (1994 & Supp. 1995)). The "patterned sex
offender" statute requires judges to sentence offenders to the statutory maximum or at

least double the presumptive sentence, whichever is lower, if:
(1) the offender committed

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

11

1150

William Mitchell
Law MITCHELL
Review, Vol. 21,
Iss. REViEW
4 [2014], Art. 4
WLLIAM
LAW

[Vol. 21

As previously noted, use of the psychopathic personality statute was
infrequent from the 1960s through 1990.67 But in 1990 and 1991, the
public was enraged by several more rape/murders committed by
recently released sex offenders who had been sentenced under the old
guidelines. 68 Again, the legislature reacted to the outcry by enacting
tougher criminal measures,69 including longer sentences for first- and

(a) criminal sexual conduct in any of the first through fourth degrees, or
(b) another specified crime, seeMINN. STAT. § 609.1352, subd. 2 (1994), and
the court finds that the "crime was motivated by the offender's sexual
impulses or was part of a predatory pattern of behavior that had criminal
sexual conduct as its goal";
(2) the court finds that the offender poses a danger to the public; and
(3) based upon a professional opinion that the offender is a "patterned sex
offender," the court finds that long-term treatment or supervision is required
beyond the presumptive sentence and supervised release period.
MINN. STAT. § 609.1352, subd. 1 (1994). The statute defines a "patterned sex offender"
as "one whose criminal sexual behavior is so engrained that the risk of reoffending is
great without intensive psychotherapeutic intervention or other long-term controls."
Id. subd. 1(a) (3); see State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 1993) (upholding
constitutionality of patterned sex offender statute), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1316 (1994).
The statute has been employed more frequently each year. In 1990, five individuals
were sentenced as patterned sex offenders; in 1991, the number rose to 11; and in
1992, the statute was invoked 19 times. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8,
at 33.
In addition to the patterned sex offender law, the legislature formulated a "heinous
crimes" statute, which under certain circumstances mandates a life sentence without
possibility of release for persons convicted of first-degree murder. Act ofJune 1, 1989,
ch. 290, art. 2, § 10, 1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1592 (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 609.184 (1994)). The sentence was to be imposed on those who had a previous
conviction for one of several offenses, including first- or second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, if it was committed with force or violence. Id.
66. Act ofJune 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 4, § 22, 1989 Minn. Laws 1580, 1625.
67. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
68. In less than one year, 23-year-old Melissa Johnson, 14-year-old Jamie Cooksey,
and 18-year-old Carin Streufert were raped and murdered. See State v. Stewart, 514
N.W.2d 559, 561 (Minn. 1994) (Johnson murder); State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593,
597 (Minn. 1993) (Cooksey murder); State v. Sullivan, 502 N.W.2d 200, 200-01 (Minn.
1993) (Streufert murder); State v. Swanson, 498 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Minn. 1993)
(Streufert murder). Johnson was killed by a twice-convicted sex offender, who had been
released from prison just four days earlier. Killer of St. Cloud Student Sentenced to Life in
Prison, SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Aug. 29, 1992, at A1O.

The man who

murdered Cooksey had a prior conviction for criminal sexual conduct and had been
sought for nearly ten months for violating his parole. See Wayne Wangstad, Murder
Charges Sought in Sex Assault, Strangling,SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Oct. 19,

1990, at Cl. One month after killing Cooksey, he was apprehended while attempting
to assault another young woman. Id. Streufert was killed by two men, one of whom
had three convictions for felony theft. See Larry Oakes, 2 Arraigned in Slaying of Woman
from Grand Rapids, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 21, 1991, at Al.
69. See Dennis J. McGrath & Jim Parsons, Two Killings Inspire Tough Talk from
Legislature, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 20, 1991, at Al; Lydia Villalva Lijo & Nina
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second-degree criminal sexual conduct."0 And Minnesota's Commissioner of Corrections instituted a system to evaluate soon-to-be-released
sex offenders and to refer the cases to county attorneys for possible
commitment under the psychopathic personality statute.7'

Brook, Carlson to Appoint Commission on Violent Crime, SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS
DISPATCH, July 21, 1991, at A10; Is State's Justice System Tough Enough to Curb Rise in
Violence?, SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Aug. 18, 1991, atA15; Donna Halvorsen,
Senate PanelRejects Death-Penalty Bill: Backers May Try to Tack Issue onto Crime Bill, Put It
to Voters, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 25, 1992, at B1. Most notably, the legislature
gave the supreme court authority to establish a statewide judicial panel to preside over
psychopathic personality commitment proceedings. See MINN. STAT. § 526.115 (1992)
(now codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 4 (1994)). Thus far, the supreme court
has not created such a panel. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
The legislature also expanded the "heinous crimes" statute, see supra note 65, by
including third-degree criminal sexual conduct committed with force or violence as a
"heinous crime." Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 4, § 4, 1992 Minn. Laws 1983, 201516 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.184, subd. 1(a)(3) (1994)). Thus, someone
convicted of first-degree murder who had a prior conviction for third-degree criminal
sexual conduct could be sentenced to life under this law. See id. The statute also was
augmented to require a life sentence for anyone convicted of first-degree murder who
committed the act while committing or attempting to commit first- or second-degree
criminal sexual conduct with force or violence. Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 1,
§ 13, 1992 Minn. Laws 1983, 1991-92 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.184, subd.
2(1) (1994)).
70. The maximum penalty for first-degree criminal sexual conduct rose from 25
to 30 years, Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 1, § 14, 1992 Minn. Laws 1983, 1992-93
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.342, subd. 2 (1994)), and from 20 to 25 years for
offenses in the second degree, Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 1, § 15, 1992 Minn.
Laws 1983, 1994-95 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.343, subd. 2 (1994)).
71. See FRANK W. WOOD, MINN. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, RISK ASSESSMENT AND
RELEASE PROCEDURES FOR VIOLENT OFFENDERS/SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS 9-10, 17-20 (1991).
This report was prepared at the behest of Governor Arne Carlson, who directed the
Department of Corrections to review its policies regarding violent offenders' transition
from prison to the community. Id. at attached Executive Summary. "The initial priority
was to put in place a procedure to ensure that sexual psychopaths and/or other
predatory and violent offenders already in the system are identified." Id. at 3.
At least in part, the department began systematic screening of soon-to-be-released
sex offenders because it believed judges were not identifying candidates for commitment at the initial sentencing. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supranote 8, at 14; see
also supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing "dual commitment"). In fact,
only two commitments are believed to have been instituted pursuant to the "dual
sentencing" statute that took effect in 1989. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supranote
8, at 22.
The purpose of the Department of Corrections' screening process is to identify
'offenders already in or entering the corrections system whose behaviors prior to
commitment or related to the offender's committing offense or during incarceration
indicate that the offender is a candidate for civil commitment as a psychopathic
personality or may represent a risk to the public upon release." WOOD, supra, at 9. The
legislature subsequently adopted these screening procedures as law. See MINN. STAT.
§ 244.05, subd. 7 (1994).
Each correctional facility is responsible for screening inmates prior to release.
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The Department of Corrections' screening system appears to be
responsible, in large part, for the recent dramatic rise in psychopathic
personality commitments.7 2 From January 1990 through November
1995, 100 individuals were committed as psychopathic personalities or
sexually dangerous persons.73 This stands in sharp contrast to the
fourteen individuals committed during the previous decade and the
two individuals committed in 1990."M
Of the 623 sex offenders released from Minnesota state prisons
between January 1991 and July 1993, forty-six (7.4 percent) were
committed as psychopathic personalities. 75 On average, each of these
individuals had three prior convictions, multiple victims, and served 6.8
years in prison.76 Most had been sentenced prior to the 1989 and
1991 amendments to the statutory maximum sentences.7 7
At present, ninety-five men and one woman are committed as sexual
psychopathic personalities or sexually dangerous persons. 7 Until
supra note 8, at 24. If a soon-to-be-released sex
offender meets any of the "public risk monitoring" criteria, his or her case will be
referred to the appropriate county attorney. Id. The criteria are:
(1) whether the conviction offense involved actual or attempted injury of the
victim,
(2) prior history of (including convictions for) assaultive behavior,
(3) assessments of mental health problems,
(4) whether the person has prior convictions for criminal sexual conduct,
(5) whether the conviction offense or any prior offenses involved the use of a
weapon,
(6) whether the corrections staff considers the individual a potential public risk,
(7) whether the inmate is a recidivist.
Id. at 24 n.47. While data are not available for all correctional facilities, in 1992 one
facility referred 29 of its 185 soon-to-be-released sex offenders (16 percent) to county
attorneys for possible psychopathic personality commitment proceedings. Id. at 25.
72. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 13. Two-thirds of the recent
petitions for commitment were initiated following a referral from the Department of
Corrections. Id.
73. Conrad deFiebre, Psychopathic Sex Offenders Get New Home, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 5, 1995, at B1, B6.
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT,

75.

LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-15. Another five of these

individuals, who were initially sought to be committed as psychopathic personalities,
ultimately were committed as mentally ill, mentally ill and dangerous, mentally retarded,
or chemically dependent. Id. at 15.
76. Id. at 17. The average length of prison sentence was calculated from data
available for 37 of these individuals. Id. at 17 n.33.
77. Id. at 22; see supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (outlining changes in
statutory maximum sentences). The average sentence for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct increased from 6.5 years in 1986 to 10.6 years in 1992. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S
REPORT, supra note 8, at 32.
78. Minnesota's Committed Sex Offenders, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 5, 1995, at
B6. The 66 sexual psychopaths detained at the Minnesota Security Hospital as of
August 1994 collectively are estimated to have victimized at least 300 individuals. Blake
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recently, most of them were housed at the Minnesota Security Hospital
(MSH) in Saint Peter.79 A new 100-bed facility, intended to house
only sexual psychopathic personalities and sexually dangerous persons,
recently opened at Moose Lake, Minnesota.80 About seventy individuals have been or soon will be transferred from MSH to Moose Lake.8 1
It has been suggested that civil commitments of sex offenders will
decrease in the near future, as the individuals sentenced since August
1989 probably will be incarcerated for longer periods.82 Any abatement, however, is likely to be temporary, since most convicted sex
offenders eventually will finish their sentences and become due for
release.8" Corrections staff and county attorneys then will need to
determine whether these individuals are candidates for civil commitment 4 as sexual psychopathic personalities or, if the new statutory
classification is upheld, as sexually dangerous persons.85
2.

The Commitment Process

Despite recent changes in the law, the process for committing an
individual as a sexual psychopathic personality has remained fairly
constant for several decades, 6 and the same procedures now apply to
the commitment of sexually dangerous persons.87 The fis
first step is
preparation of a petition for commitment.8
Such a petition is

Morrison, 66 Sexual Psychopaths Have Vctimized 300 People, SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Aug. 31, 1994, at Al; see also Whom Do We Fear?, SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 31,
1994, at B8 (profiling sexual psychopaths confined at the Minnesota Security Hospital).
79. See deFiebre, supra note 73, at BI.
80. See id. A new 50-bed wing also was added to MSH to accommodate overflow
from the Moose Lake facility, and Moose Lake was designed to allow for another 50-bed
expansion. Id. at B6.
81. See id. at B1. As of November 1995, 76 of the 96 civilly-committed individuals
were at MSH or Moose Lake, eight remained in state prisons, 10 were on provisional
discharge, and the whereabouts of two escapees were unknown. Minnesota's Committed
Sex Offenders, supra note 78, at B6.
82. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 34.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85. As discussed infra, the classification of "sexually dangerous persons" is a new,
broader category of civil commitment under which convicted sex offenders may be detained beyond their scheduled release from prison. See infra part III.A.; see also MINN.
STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (1994).
86. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.18-.185 (1994) (describing procedures for
commitment). In 1969, the legislature passed a measure which rendered psychopathic
personality commitments subject to the same procedures governing the commitment
of mentally ill and dangerous individuals. Act approved May 15, 1969, ch. 431, § 1,
1969 Minn. Laws 657, 657-58 (amending MINN. STAT. § 526.10 (1967)).
87. See supra note 85.
88. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185 (1994); MINN. R.P. CIV. COMMITMENT 1. As discussed
above, the catalyst for action by county attorneys in recent years has been the pre-
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initiated by the county attorney if he or she is satisfied that good cause
exists to pursue commitment. 9
Once a petition is filed, a person alleged to be a sexual psychopathic
personality or sexually dangerous person is committed under the
procedures that govern the commitment of mentally ill and dangerous
individuals.9" The court appoints counsel for the individual ("respondent")." 1 The court also designates an examiner and advises the
respondent of his or her right to secure an independent second
evaluation.9 2 After examining the individual, and prior to the initial
commitment hearing, the court-appointed examiner(s) files a report
93
with the court.

release screening procedures instituted by the Department of Corrections. See supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
89. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (1994). The county attorney may request a
"pre-petition screening report" to assist in determining whether a petition is warranted.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. This procedure typically is conducted by
mental health, medical, and social work professionals who interview the individual (or
"respondent"), review the available evidence, and prepare a written recommendation
to the county attorney. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 20. While it
is required for all other civil commitments, the pre-petition screening report is optional
for the commitment of sexual psychopathic personalities or sexually dangerous persons,
and it rarely is requested by county attorneys. Id. at 20-21.
The petition may be brought in any county where the individual resides, is
otherwise "present," or was convicted of the offense for which he or she currently is
incarcerated. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (1994). The petition must allege
specific facts and incidents giving rise to the petition and identify potential witnesses
thereto. MINN. R.P. CIV. COMMITMENT 1.01.
90. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (1994).
91. MINN. R.P. CIV. COMMITMENT 3.01.
92. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07, subd. 3 (1994); see also MINN. R.P. ClV. COMMITMENT
7.02 (requiring reimbursement of an examiner appointed upon the respondent's
request). The court-appointed examiner must be a licensed physician or psychologist
who is knowledgeable about the individual's alleged impairment. MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.02, subd. 7 (1994); see also MINN. R.P. CIV. COMMITMENT 7.01 (stating that
examiners are selected from a list compiled by the court). The county attorney and the
respondent's attorney may be present during the examination(s). MINN. STAT. §
253B.07, subd. 5 (1994).
The respondent and counsel must be given access to the respondent's medical
records. MINN. R.P. Civ. COMMITMENT 5.01-.02. If such access is denied, the records
will be excluded from evidence when challenged by the respondent. MINN. R.P. Crv.
COMMITMENT 5.03.

93. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07, subd. 5 (1994). Copies of the first examiner's report
are made available to the individual and her or his counsel. Id.; MINN. R.P. Civ.
COMMITMENT 8.03. If an examiner was appointed at the respondent's request, his or
her report must be furnished to the petitioner. MINN. R.P. Clv. COMMITMENT 8.03.
Reports prepared by both court-appointed examiners must include opinions regarding
(1) whether the respondent is mentally ill, mentally retarded, or chemically dependent;
(2) whether commitment is recommended; (3) the examiner's recommendation as to
the form, location, and conditions of treatment; and (4) whether a substantial
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The initial hearing on the petition must be held within fourteen days
of the petition's filing, although the period may be extended an
additional thirty days if good cause is shown.94 The statute assures
the respondent, her or his counsel, and the petitioner of the rights to
95
notice, to attend and testify, to present and cross-examine witnesses,
and to present relevant evidence.96 If the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondent is a sexual psychopathic
personality or a sexually dangerous person, it will commit the
individual to a treatment facility for a sixty-day evaluation.97
Within sixty days, a written treatment report must be filed with the
court.9" Within fourteen days of receiving the report, or within ninety
days of the initial commitment, the court must hold a second and final
hearing.9 9 If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

likelihood exists that respondent will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious harm.
MINN. R.P. Civ. COMMITMENT 8.02.
94. MINN. STAT. § 253B.08, subd. 1 (1994). In addition, the respondent may
demand an immediate hearing, which must be held within five to 15 business days of
the demand. Id.
95. In addition to those appointed to examine the respondent, see supra note 92
and accompanying text, witnesses often include corrections staff, victims, treatment
professionals, and those who know the individual. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT,
supra note 8, at 20.
96. MINN. STAT. § 253B.08, subds. 2-4, 7 (1994); see also MINN. R.P. CIv.
COMMITMENT 10.01 (requiring respondent's presence at hearing). The respondent may
waive his or her right to attend the hearing, or she or he may be excluded if "seriously
disruptive" or "totally incapable of comprehending and participating in the proceedings." MINN. STAT. § 253B.08, subd. 5 (1994); accord MINN. R.P. CIV. COMMITMENT
10.01-.02.
In addition to testimony from the witnesses described above, see supra note 95, the
bulk of the evidence presented at commitment hearings consists of files pertaining to
the individual's history, especially his or her sexual history. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S
REPORT, supra note 8, at 22. In particular, the individual's "base file," compiled by the
facility at which she or he is incarcerated, plays a key role. Id. at 28. The contents of
inmates' base files vary considerably, because different correctional facilities keep
different types of information in them. Id. For example, some facilities place all
psychological, medical, and program information in the files, while others exclude
information such as that confided or written by the person pursuant to treatment. Id.
at 28. Since these files greatly influence county attorneys' decisions to petition and
judges' decisions to commit, inconsistencies among the record keeping systems can have
a powerful effect on the commitment process. Id. at 28-29.
97. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subds. 1-2 (1994). The 60-day process typically includes
psychiatric and psychological evaluations of the respondent, as well as assessments by
vocational rehabilitation, recreational therapy, social work, chemical dependency, and
education staff. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 20.
98. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 2 (1994); see supra note 93 (describing required
contents of treatment report). The treatment facility's failure to submit the treatment
report does not result in the individual being automatically discharged. MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.18, subd. 2 (1994).
99. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 2 (1994).
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the respondent is a sexual psychopathic personality or a sexually
dangerous person, it orders the individual to be committed for an
indeterminate period to the Minnesota Security Hospital."° Most
petitions for commitment are granted.'
Individuals who are committed as sexual psychopathic personalities
or sexually dangerous persons are afforded the same rights as others
who are civilly committed under alternate classifications. 0 2 Chief
among those rights is the right to petition for transfer or
discharge,0 3 and the standards governing the discharge or transfer
of mentally ill and dangerous patients apply with like force to sexual
psychopathic personalities and sexually dangerous persons. 4
The individual, or the head of the treatment facility to which the
individual is committed, may petition the Commissioner of Human
Services' 5 for transfer,0 6 provisional discharge,'°7 or full
100. Id. subd. 3. If the individual simultaneously is sentenced for a criminal
conviction, see supra note 63 and accompanying text, he or she serves the prison
sentence before being transferred to MSH. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 3 (1994).
101. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 15. Of the psychopathic
personality cases finalized between January 1991 and September 1993, 64 percent were
decided in favor of commitment. Id.
102. See generally MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (enumerating rights
of patients). Psychopathic personalities and sexually dangerous persons are grouped
with mentally ill and dangerous, chemically dependent, mentally retarded, and mentally
ill individuals with respect to the fundamental rights they enjoy. See MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.02, subds. 2, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18a, 18b (1994). Although subject to some restrictions, these freedoms include the right to be free from restraints; to correspond, receive
visitors, and make phone calls; to summon counsel, spiritual advisors, or physicians; to
be represented by counsel at any proceeding relating to the commitment; to receive
periodic physical and mental assessments; to receive "proper care and treatment" and
to accept or reject the same; and to have access to personal medical records. MINN.
STAT. § 253B.03, subds. 1-6 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
103. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 5 (1994).
104. Id. § 253B.185, subd. 1.
105. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 5.
106. Id. If the transfer contemplated is to the custody of the Commissioner of
Corrections, the following factors are weighed:
(1) the person's unamenability to treatment;
(2) the person's unwillingness or failure to follow treatment recommendations;
(3) the person's lack of progress in treatment at the.., hospital;
(4) the danger posed by the person to other patients or staff at the ...
hospital; and
(5) the degree of security necessary to protect the public.
Id. § 253B.185, subd. 2(a).
107. Provisional discharge is granted if the person committed "is capable of making
an acceptable adjustment to open society." Id. § 253B.18, subd. 7. Factors to be
considered include:
(a) whether the [person's] course of hospitalization and present mental
status indicate there is no longer a need for inpatient treatment and
supervision; and
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discharge. °8 All such petitions
are considered by a three-member
"special review board.""°
The board holds a hearing on each
petition"' and makes its recommendation to the Commissioner, who
then issues an order regarding the petition within fourteen days of the
hearing."' The Commissioner's decision may be appealed to a
special panel"' and thereafter to the court of appeals."'
For an individual to be fully discharged, the Commissioner of
Human Services must be satisfied that the person can "[make] an
acceptable adjustment to open society, is no longer dangerous to the
public, and is no longer in need of inpatient treatment and supervision.""' The petitioning party bears the burden of demonstrating,

(b)

whether the conditions of the provisional discharge plan will provide a
reasonable degree of protection to the public and will enable the
[individual] to adjust to the community.
Id. These criteria have withstood a constitutional challenge from an individual
committed as a psychopathic personality. See Enebak v. Noot, 353 N.W.2d 544, 547
(Minn. 1984) (rejecting contention that statute violated due process principles articulated in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983)).
Provisional discharge is conditioned upon a quarterly evaluation of the individual's
status and compliance with the provisional discharge plan. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.18,
subd. 8 (1994). Provisional discharge may be revoked under certain circumstances, see
id. subds. 10-14, or continued indefinitely until the person petitions for full discharge,
id. subd. 9.
108. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
109. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 4 (1994). Appointed by the Commissioner of
Human Services, the review board consists of three individuals, including at least one
physician and one attorney, who are experienced in the field of mental illness. Id.
110. Id. subd. 5. While the board must give interested parties written notice of the
time and place of the hearing within 45 days of the petition's filing, id., there is no time
frame within which the hearing must be held, although the board must meet at least
every six months, id. subd. 4.
111. Id. subd. 5.
112. Id. § 253B.19, subd. 2. Established by the supreme court, the appeal panel
consists of three judges and four alternates appointed from the state's judiciary. Id.
subd. 1. The panel must consider the matter within 45 days of the individual's filing
a petition of appeal. Id. subd. 2. The rights afforded the parties and the procedures
followed in the appeal closely resemble those used in the initial commitment
proceeding. See id.; see also supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (describing
procedures governing initial proceeding).
113. MINN. STAT. § 253B.19, subd. 5 (1994).
114. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 15. The statute also states that discharge must be denied
if there is no "reasonable degree of protection to the public" and no assistance available
to the individual in adjusting to community living. Id. However, the court of appeals
has held that this language "adds no new.. . requirement to the discharge provisions."
Reome v. Levine, 350 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review granted and
remanded, 361 N.W.2d 29 (Minn. 1985), on remand 363 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985), appeal after remand, 379 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), habeas corpus granted,
692 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Minn. 1988).
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by a preponderance of the evidence, that these criteria are met."'
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court considered a case
involving a civilly committed Louisiana man whose petition for
discharge had been denied." 6 Finding the pertinent Louisiana
statute unconstitutional, the Court's opinion precipitated new
challenges to civil commitment statutes, including a fresh assault upon
17
Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute."
D. New Groundsfor Challenges: Foucha v. Louisiana
In October 1984, Terry Foucha, charged with aggravated burglary
and illegal discharge of a firearm, was found not guilty by reason of
insanity."'
At trial, doctors testified that Foucha was unable to
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense, and the trial
court found that he was insane at the time of the crimes and at the
time of trial.' 9
Pursuant to Louisiana statute, 2 Foucha was committed to a
mental health facility. 12 1 In 1988, after the facility's superintendent

115. Drewes v. Levine, 352 N.W.2d 456, 458-59 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In contrast,
a prosecuting attorney or attorney general in Washington state bears the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual committed under the state's
"sexually violent predator" statute is still likely to commit sexually violent, predatory acts
if released. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.090(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
116. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
117. See In reBlodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994);
see also infra part II.E.
118. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 73-74.
119. Id. Louisiana law absolves a person of criminal responsibility if he or she was
"incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in
question." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986).
120. The pertinent statute provides in part:
When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity in any [noncapital] felony case, the court shall remand him to the parish jail or to a
private mental institution approved by the court and shall promptly hold a
contradictory hearing at which the defendant shall have the burden of proof,
to determine whether the defendant can be discharged or can be released on
probation, without danger to others or to himself. If the court determines
that the defendant cannot be released without danger to others or to himself,
it shall order him committed to a proper state mental institution or to a
private mental institution approved by the court for custody, care, and
treatment. If the court determines that the defendant can be discharged or
released on probation without danger to others or to himself, the court shall
either order his discharge, or order his release on probation subject to
specified conditions for a fixed or an indeterminate period. The court shall
assign written findings of fact and conclusions of law; however, the assignment
of reasons shall not delay the implementation ofjudgment.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 654 (West 1981) (amended 1982); see also LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 655-57 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth procedures for
application for discharge or release).
121. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 74.
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recommended that Foucha be discharged, a three-member panel
convened to determine Foucha's condition and concluded that there
had been no evidence of mental illness since Foucha's admission three
and one-half years earlier. 22 The panel recommended that Foucha
23
be conditionally discharged.
Two of the doctors on the panel then were appointed by the trial
judge to serve as a "sanity commission."12 4 The doctors reported that
Foucha was in remission from mental illness, but they refused to
"'certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if
released.""'
At a hearing, one of the doctors testified that Foucha
had an antisocial personality, which the doctor described as an
untreatable condition, and that he would not "'feel comfortable in
certifying that [Foucha] would not be a danger to himself or to other
people.""26
Finding that Foucha was a danger to himself and others, the trial
court ordered him back to the mental institution. 127 The state
supreme court affirmed, holding that Foucha had not carried the
statute-imposed burden of proving that he was not dangerous.' 28
Relying on Jones v. United States,129 the supreme court held that the
provision permitting confinement of an insanity acquittee based on
dangerousness alone offended neither the Equal Protection Clause nor
the Due Process Clause."3
On appeal, the United 3States Supreme Court declared the Louisiana
statute unconstitutional. '
1.

Due Process

The Court cited Jones for the proposition that an individual
committed following an insanity acquittal "'is entitled to release when

122. Id.
123. Id. The panel suggested that Foucha be placed on probation, remain drug and
alcohol free, regularly attend a substance abuse clinic, submit to drug testing, and be
employed or actively seeking employment. Id. at n.2.
124.

Id. at 74; see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 655 (West 1981) (amended

1985, 1987) (setting forth the procedure for discharge or release on probation).
125. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 74-75 (quoting from the doctors' written report to the trial
court).
126. Id. at 75 (quoting the doctor's testimony from the appellant's brief). It was
stipulated that the other doctor would have given the same testimony, had he been
available. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (holding that the government is justified in confining an
individual to a mental institution based upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity).
130. Foucha,504 U.S. at 75.
131. See id. at 83-85.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

21

LAW
W/LLIAM
William Mitchell
Law MITEU
Review, Vol. 21,
Iss. 4REVEW
[2014], Art. 4

[Vol. 21

he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous. '"132 Because
Foucha was not mentally ill when the trial court considered the
that Louisiana's continued
petition for release, the Court found
33
confinement of him was unjustifiable.
The Court also rejected the state's contention that the commitment
was justified on the basis of Foucha's antisocial personality, which
rendered him "dangerous":
There are at least three difficulties with this position. First, even if
his continued confinement were constitutionally permissible, keeping
Foucha against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a
determination in civil commitment proceedings of current mental
illness and dangerousness....
Second, if Foucha can no longer be held as an insanity acquittee
in a mental hospital, he is entitled to constitutionally adequate
procedures to establish the grounds for his confinement....
Third, "the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component
that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless
of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them."' ...
Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.ls 4
The Court reasoned that because Foucha was absolved of criminal
responsibility, Louisiana could not invoke its police power to "punish"
him with continued confinement.'
Relying on United States v. Salerno, s6 Louisiana argued that persons
who are merely dangerous to themselves or others may be confined."3 7 The Court rejected this argument, noting that Salerno
involved pretrial detention of individuals accused of serious crimes and
that numerous procedural safeguards were in place to preserve the
detainees' rights:ss

132.
133.
134.

Id. at 77 (emphasis added) (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 368).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 78-80 (citations omitted) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125

(1990)).
135. Id. at 80.
136. 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding statute authorizing pretrial detention on the
basis of dangerousness, given the stringent procedural safeguards provided by the
statute and in light of government's compelling interest in preventing crime by
arrestees).

137. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
138. Id. at 81. The statute challenged in Salerno limited the crimes for which an
accused could be detained; required the government to show probable cause; provided
for a "full-blown adversary hearing," at which the government was required to prove that
the detainee posed "an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the
community"; limited the maximum duration of confinement; and more. Id. (quoting
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751).
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Unlike the sharply focused scheme at issue in Salerno, the Louisiana
scheme of confinement is not carefully limited. Under the state
statute, Foucha is not now entitled to an adversary hearing at which
the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is
demonstrably dangerous to the community. Indeed, the State need
prove nothing to justify continued detention, for the statute places
the burden on the detainee to prove that he is not dangerous 3 9
The Louisiana statute permitted indefinite commitment based upon a
doctor's testimony that he would not "feel comfortable" in certifying
that a detainee would not be dangerous to himself or others."4
According to the Court, however, such testimony "is not enough to
defeat Foucha's liberty interest under the Constitution." 4'
By
permitting the indefinite detention of insanity acquittees who are not
mentally ill but who cannot prove they pose no danger to themselves
or others, Louisiana's statute failed to meet the standards of the Due
Process Clause and its "carefully limited exceptions."'4 2
2. Equal Protection
The Court has held that insanity acquittees may be treated differently than others who are subject to civil commitment. 43
But
Louisiana's statute authorized the indefinite detention of those who,
like Foucha, had regained their sanity' 44 Because other individuals
who had committed crimes and who could not prove they were not
dangerous were not subject to such detention, 4 5 the Court found the
statute violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. "Freedom from physical restraint being a fundamental right,
the State must have a particularly convincing reason, which it has not

139. Id. at 81-82.
140. Id. at 82.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 83. The Court specified three circumstances under which a state may
exercise its police power to confine individuals: (1) a state may incarcerate convicted
criminals to punish them and to deter similar conduct; (2) a state may confine those
who are shown, by clear and convincing evidence, to be mentally ill and dangerous; and
(3) "in certain narrow circumstances [e.g., pretrial detention] persons who pose a
danger to others or to the community may be subject to limited confinement." Id. at
80.
143. SeeJones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363-66 (1983) (holding that an insanity

acquittee may be committed automatically as a mentally ill and dangerous person
without the usual commitment proceeding because the verdict establishes the fact of
mental illness and "certainly indicates dangerousness").
144. Foucha,504 U.S. at 85.
145. Id. The Court stated, "[S]tate law does not allow for their continuing
confinement based merely on dangerousness. Instead, the State controls the behavior
of these similarly situated citizens by relying on other means, such as punishment,
deterrence, and supervised release." Id.
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against insanity acquittees who are
put forward, for such discrimination
46
no longer mentally ill."'
The Court noted that in civil commitment proceedings, a state must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is insane
and dangerous, 47 and the clear and convincing standard also applies
when a state seeks to confine an insane convict beyond his or her
criminal sentence. 48 Absent some justification for the disparate
treatment given now-sane acquittees, the Court held that Louisiana
could not continue to confine Foucha "solely because he [was]
deemed dangerous, but without assuming the burden of proving even
this ground for confinement by clear and convincing evidence." 49
Thus, the Court appeared to leave the door open to commitments
based upon dangerousness alone5 0 but indicated that the burden
was upon the state to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
individual remained dangerous.' 5'
E. In re Blodgett
In the wake of Foucha, the constitutionality of Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute was contested anew, and the state supreme
court again upheld the statute in a 4-3 decision issued in January
1994.152 The challenge was instigated by Phillip Blodgett, who had
a history of violence and sexual misconduct dating back to 1982.153
Blodgett had been adjudicated delinquent at the age of sixteen for
having sexual contact with his brother.5 4 He subsequently was
convicted of battery, violating a domestic abuse restraining order, and

146. Id. at 86.
147. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-33 (1979)).
148. Id. (citingJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966)).
149. Id.
150. In addition to the majority's language quoted above, see supra text accompanying note 149, Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion specifically stated:
I do not understand the Court to hold that Louisiana may never confine
dangerous insanity acquittees after they regain mental health....
It might.., be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee
who has regained sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and
duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns
related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness.
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
151. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86.
152. In reBlodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994). The
dissenting opinion was written byjustice Rosalie Wahl, who was joined by ChiefJustice
A.M. Keith andJustice Esther TomUanovich. See infra text accompanying notes 178-89.
153. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 911.
154. Id.
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first-degree burglary for entering a dwelling with intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct.'55 Finally, Blodgett was found guilty on two
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct for assaults committed while he was enrolled in a pre-release program and while on
supervised release to a halfway house.' 56
Blodgett was finishing his sentence for these last two offenses when,
upon the recommendation of the Department of Corrections, the
Washington County Attorney filed a petition seeking Blodgett's
commitment under the psychopathic personality statute. 157 At the
initial hearing, the five psychologists who had examined Blodgett
agreed that he had an antisocial personality disorder, that he was
chemically dependent, and that he was dangerous.5 s Four of the
five psychologists testified that
Blodgett met the statutory definition of
59
a psychopathic personality.
Finding by clear and convincing evidence that Blodgett was a
psychopathic personality, the trial court committed him to the
Minnesota Security Hospital for a sixty-day evaluation."6
While
generally concurring with the diagnoses of the doctors who had
testified at the initial hearing, the hospital staff opposed Blodgett's
commitment as a psychopathic personality on the ground that he was
untreatable. In fact, the hospital's senior staff psychiatrist testified that
any treatment given would be a "sham" or a "placebo."' 6 ' Nevertheless, the court ordered Blodgett
committed to the security hospital for
162
an indeterminate period.
Blodgett appealed to the court of appeals, which upheld the trial
court's determination, 63 and then to the supreme court.'" 4 Rely65
ing upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Foucha,1
Blodgett challenged the statute as violative of substantive due process
rights and equal
protection under the United States and Minnesota
66
Constitutions.
With respect to the due process issue, Blodgett argued that because

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
al. Id.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 911-12.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The trial court also found the psychopathic personality statute constitutionIn re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 912.
See supra part II.D.
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 912.
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he is not mentally ill, according to accepted medical definitions, 167
he could not be confined by the state."6 A majority of the supreme
court rejected this contention: "Whatever the explanation or label, the
'psychopathic personality' is an identifiable and documentable violent
sexually deviant condition or disorder."'69 While acknowledging the
widespread belief that such individuals are not amenable to treatment,
the court70 found that the state's interest in public safety was overarching.'

Noting the safeguards in place to guarantee the rights of those
committed,' 7 ' the court held that the statute did not violate substantive due process. 72 The majority concluded, "[I]f there is a remission of Blodgett's sexual disorder, if his deviant sexual assaultive
conduct is brought under control, he, too, is entitled to be
released."17

The court then considered Blodgett's contention that the psychopathic personality statute, as then formulated, 174 violated equal
protection under the federal and state constitutions. 7' Blodgett
argued that the statute denied sexual predators their liberty while76
other dangerous, but not mentally ill, individuals remained free.
Interpreting this as "simply a variation of [the] substantive due process
argument," the majority asserted "that the sexual predator poses 77a
danger that is unlike any other" and rejected Blodgett's challenge.

167. See infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
168. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914. Blodgett argued that he did not fit within the
"carefully limited exceptions" allowed by the Due Process Clause as articulated in
Foucha. Id.; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text (listing the exceptions
enumerated in Foucha).
169. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915 (citing Margit Henderson & Seth Kalichman,
Sexually Deviant Behavior and Schizotypy: A Theoretical Perspective with Supportive Data,
PSYCHIATRIC Q., Winter 1990, at 281). The court did not believe the list of "carefully
limited exceptions" in Foucha to be comprehensive. Id. at 914 n.6.
170. Id. at 916.
171. The court cited such protections as periodic review and reevaluation; petition
for transfer; de novo judicial review; and the right to proper care, treatment, and
periodic medical assessment. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (noting that the appellant in Pearson, see supra part II.B., was released within
a year of commitment).
174. See MINN. STAT. §§ 526.09-.10 (1992) (repealed 1994); see also supranote 23, 3334 and accompanying text.
175. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 916-17.
176. Id. at 917.
177. Id. The court distinguished sex offenders from other violent persons, stating
that "Pearson delineates genuine and substantial distinctions which define a class that
victimizes women and children in a particular manner."
Id. (citing Bailey v.
Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting equal protection challenge
to psychopathic personality statute)). The court concluded:
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The dissenting justices agreed with Blodgett that the statute violated
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 s According to the minority, "IT]he rigor and methodical efficiency with which the psychopathic personality statute is
presently being enforced is creating a system of wholesale preventive
detention, a concept foreign to our jurisprudence." 79 They noted
the arbitrary enforcement of the statute, as well as the inconsistent
application of the Pearson standard.8 " The three justices also expressed concern about the indefinite duration of these commitments
and the difficulty of procuring release.'
While acknowledging that there is a powerful state interest in
protecting the public from violent sexual assaults, the minority found
that
[t]he state has not adequately explained why its police power interest
cannot be vindicated by ordinary criminal processes involving charge
and conviction, the use of enhanced sentences for recidivists, and
other constitutionally permissible means of dealing with patterns of
criminal conduct. Nor has the state shown that confinement of
psychopathic personalities is even rationally related to the asserted
purpose of treatment as required by Jachson ....
[Blodgett] does
not suffer from a medically recognized mental illness; he has a
personality disorder for which,
at least at this point, there appears to
82
be no treatment available'
The dissent concluded that Foucha did indeed render Minnesota's
psychopathic personality statute violative of substantive due process

At issue is the safety of the public on the one hand and, on the other, the
liberty interests of the individual who acts destructively for reasons not fully
understood by our medical, biological and social sciences. In the final
analysis, it is the moral credibility of the criminal justice system that is at stake.
... [A] state legislature should be allowed, constitutionally, to choose either

or both alternatives for dealing with the sexual predator. At the very least, we
should follow Pearsonuntil the United States Supreme Court says otherwise.
Id. at 918 (foomote omitted).
178. Id. (Wahl, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (footnote omitted).
180. Id. at 920. The dissentingjustices cited cases in which courts did not follow the

Pearson construction but instead relied solely upon the statutory definition. Id. at n.6
(citing Dittrich v. Brown County, 215 Minn. 234, 235, 9 N.W.2d 510, 511 (1943); In re
Monson, 478 N.W.2d 785, 788-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); In re Clements, 440 N.W.2d
133, 136 (Minn. CL App. 1989); In re Brown, 414 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987); In re Stone, 376 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Minn. CL App. 1985); In re Martenies, 350
N.W.2d 470, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
181. Id. at 924. The dissent stated, "Given the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
the proof required for release .. . of persons committed without a medically
diagnosable and treatable mental illness, commitment under the Psychopathic
Personality Statutes could result in a potential life sentence served in what amounts to
preventive detention." Id.
182. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment when used to commit offenders
indefinitely on the basis of dangerousness alone. 183
The dissenting justices also asserted that the psychopathic personality
statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause:
[The statute] can be upheld only if the state has a compelling
interest, a "particularly convincing reason," for confining in a mental
institution a class of people with psychopathic personalities when it
does not confine other classes of people who have committed
criminal
acts and who cannot later prove that they are not danger18 4
Ous.

In the dissenters' view, strict scrutiny-not the rational basis test
applied by the court of appeals-would be the appropriate standard of
review for Blodgett's claim.15 If the strict scrutiny standard were
applied, the dissent speculated, the state's invocation of police and
parens patriae powers would not be sufficiently "convincing" to override
86
the individual's liberty interest.
The dissent also cited as violative of equal protection the release
standards applicable both to those committed as mentally ill and
dangerous and those committed as psychopathic personalities.'8 7
Though the former have "a reasonable opportunity for release by
showing [they have] been treated and that [their] mental illness is in
remission or under control," those committed as psychopathic
personalities effectively do not have that opportunity.18 The dissent
concluded, "[S]tatutes which permit the involuntary and indefinite
confinement of a non-mentally ill, though potentially dangerous,
individual suffering from an untreatable personality disorder cannot
pass scrutiny." '89
Evidently, however, the United States Supreme Court did not agree

183. According to the dissent, "The statute ... has the effect of 'substituting
confinement for dangerousness for our present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only
those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law.'" Id.
at 923 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992)). "[1]f the state is to have
a constitutionally valid basis for Blodgett's confinement, it must be one of those
'carefully limited exceptions permitted by the Due Process Clause' where 'in certain

narrow circumstances persons who pose a danger to others or to the community may
be subject to limited confinement.'" Id. (quoting Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 83); see also
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987) (setting out limited exceptions to
the general principle against detainment).
184. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 925 (quoting Foucha,504 U.S. at 86).

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.; see also supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text (discussing procedures
governing petitions for release).
188. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 925 (footnote omitted).

189. Id. at 926.
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with the dissenting state court justices. Blodgett's petition for
certiorari was denied in October 1994.1" In the intervening months,
however, another controversy had erupted over the application of the
psychopathic personality statute.
E

In re Rickmyer and In re Linehan

In two rulings issued on June 30, 1994, the Minnesota Supreme
Court vacated the psychopathic personality commitments of two
convicted sex offenders,' 9' provoking a thunderous public
uproar.' 92 In both cases, the court found that the state had failed to
demonstrate one of the three requirements of Pearson.'93 The state
failed to show that Dennis Linehan evidenced "an utter lack of ability
194

to control [his] sexual impulses" (the second Pearson criterion)
and that Peter Rickmyer had inflicted or was likely to inflict serious

physical or mental harm on his victims (the third prong of the Pearson
test). 195
1.

In re Rickmyer

As Peter Rickmyer neared the end of a nine-month sentence for
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, the Ramsey County Attorney
96
petitioned to commit him as a psychopathic personality.
Rickmyer's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he spanked

190. Blodgett v. Minnesota, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994).
191. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994); In re Rickmyer, 519 N.W.2d 188
(Minn. 1994).
192. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. One member of Minnesota's House
of Representatives, Dave Bishop, even referred to ChiefJustice A.M. Keith as "the chief
zookeeper of the zoo." Panel Blasts Court Decision to Free Sex Offenders, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis),July 15, 1994, at B5. Said Rep. Bishop, "Now he's proposing to let the
tigers out one by one to see if they're dangerous." Id.
193. Rickmyer, 519 N.W.2d at 190; Linehan, 518 N.W.2d at 614; see also supra text
accompanying notes 33-34 (setting forth the three prongs of the Pearson test).
194. Linehan, 518 N.W.2d at 614 (citing State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of
Ramsey Country, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939)).
195. Rickmyer, 519 N.W.2d at 190. While the third Pearson criterion makes no
mention of serious harm, the Rickmyer court noted that "it would not be reasonable, we
cautioned in Pearson, to apply the psychopathic personality statute 'to every person
guilty of sexual misconduct nor even to persons having strong sexual propensities.'" Id.
at 189 (quoting Pearson,205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302). The court also cited the
statute relating to mentally ill and dangerous persons, defining "dangerous" as "likely
to inflict 'serious physical harm on another.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting MINN.
STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (1992)).
196. Id. The county attorney also sought to commit Rickmyer as mentally ill, but
after reviewing Rickmyer's 60-day treatment report, the district court concluded that the
evidence failed to support this contention. In re Rickmyer, No. CX-93-1446, 1993 WL
480177, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1993), rev'd, 519 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994).
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This was the latest in a
an eight-year-old boy on the buttocks. 197
series of occurrences involving Rickmyer's sexually inappropriate
conduct toward boys. l" 8
The three psychologists who examined Rickmyer agreed that he was
not mentally ill but was a pedophile." °' Staff at the Minnesota
Security Hospital diagnosed him as having both pedophilia and a
personality disorder.20 Though the psychologists and hospital staff
differed as to Rickmyer's "dangerousness," 0 ' the trial court found
that he met the Pearson standard for commitment as a psychopathic
20
Rickmyer
personality,20 2 and the court of appeals affirmed°.
appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
he was likely to inflict serious harm upon others.2 °
The supreme court agreed:
[A]mong the factors to be considered are the nature of the sexual
assaults and the degree of violence involved. Ordinarily, ...there
is a pattern of sexual assaults creating the danger of infliction of
serious physical harm....
There may be instances where a pedophile's pattern of sexual
misconduct is of such an egregious nature that there is a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or mental harm being inflicted on the
victims such as to meet the requirements for commitment as a
psychopathic personality. 5
However, the court found that Rickmyer's conduct, while "repellent,"
did not rise to the level of "injury, pain, 'or other evil' that is contem-

197.
198.

Rickmyer, 519 N.W.2d at 189.
Id. Rickmyer had been convicted of two counts of simple assault in 1981,

indecent exposure in 1989, and fifth-degree assault stemming from another "spanking"
incident in 1989. Id. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rickmyer had pled guilty to the
1991 second-degree criminal sexual conduct charge, at which time the prosecutor
dismissed three pending criminal sexual conduct charges involving other victims and
incidents. State v. Rickmyer, No. C2-91-1579, 1992 W 77532, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 21, 1992) (affirming denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea). During the
commitment proceeding, police reports also were received into evidence which revealed
numerous allegations of Rickmyer's fondling and spanking young boys. Rickmyer, 519
N.W.2d at 189.
199. Rickmyer, 519 N.W.2d at 190.
200. Id.
201. Two of the three psychologists asserted that Rickmyer presented a danger to
children. Id. The third called Rickmyer "relatively nonaggressive, nonviolent, and nondangerous," though he believed that Rickmyer likely would reoffend. Id. Noting that
Rickmyer rejected treatment, the security hospital staff stated that he posed a danger
to others "in terms of reoffending." Id.
202. Id.
203. In re Rickmyer, No. CX-93-1446, 1993 WL 480177, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov.
23, 1993), reu'd, 519 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994).
204. Rickmyer, 519 N.W.2d at 190.
205. Id.
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plated by the .. statute."206
Accordingly, the order of commitment was vacated. °7 Rickmyer
to a halfway house, from which he was released in October
was sent
0
1994.
194208
In re Linehan

2.

Dennis Linehan served nearly twenty years for the kidnapping of
Barbara Iversen, a fourteen-year-old baby sitter whom he intended to
sexually molest. 20 9

When Iversen resisted, Linehan choked her to

21 0

Linehan had several other convictions for sexual assault
death.
and attempted sexual assault, extending from his teenage years to
beyond Iversen's death. 1
Shortly before Linehan was scheduled to be released from prison for
the kidnapping conviction, the Ramsey County Attorney petitioned to
commit him as a psychopathic personality. 212 The trial court found

206.

Id. (quoting State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn.

545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939)).

207. Id.
208.

Child Molester Released After Ruling, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 19, 1994, at

B2. A district courtjudge ruled that the time Rickmyer spent in the Minnesota Security
Hospital under the improper commitment must be counted toward his 21-month
sentence. Id. Because Rickmyer had been detained more than 21 months, the judge
ordered him released. Id. The Ramsey County Attorney's office indicated that it likely
would seek to recommit Rickmyer, this time as a "sexually dangerous person" under the
new statute. Paul Gustafson, PetitionFiled Under New Law to Recommit Linehan, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 3, 1994, at B1.
209. In reLinehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 610-11 (Minn. 1994).
210. Id. at 611. Because kidnapping carried a stiffer penalty than murder at the
time, prosecutors sought conviction only on a kidnapping charge. The Linehan Case,
SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 16, 1994, at B4 (providing chronology of events
leading up to supreme court's decision). Linehan was given an indeterminate sentence
of up to 40 years. Wayne Wangstad, Residents Say Linehan Brings Fear to Bayport, SAINT
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 17, 1994, at Al.
211. Linehan, 518 N.W.2d at 610-11. As a teen, Linehan was placed in training
school for "various violations," including taking "indecent liberties" with a four-year-old
girl. Id. At the age of 22, Linehan was charged with rape, although the charges were
dismissed. Id. at 611. After Iversen's death but before his arrest, Linehan raped
another woman (though the incident was not reported) and sexually molested a twelveyear-old girl. Id. A few years after being convicted of Iversen's kidnapping, Linehan
escaped from prison, assaulted a twelve-year-old girl, and was convicted of attempted
rape. Id. In several of these incidents, Linehan threatened to kill the victims and
either used a knife or told them he had a knife. Id.
212. Id. at 610. Ramsey County also sought to commit Linehan as a chemically
dependent person; however, this petition was denied. Id. Linehan successfully had
completed an inpatient chemical dependency treatment program while incarcerated,
and the trial court found insufficient evidence to support such a commitment. Id. at
613. Without further explanation, the supreme court referred to Linehan's alcohol
abuse as "the precursor of his assaults." Id.
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Linehan to be a psychopathic personality and ordered him to be
213
committed indefinitely to the Minnesota Security Hospital (MSH).
Linehan appealed, arguing that the state failed to meet the second and
third elements
of the Pearsonstandard, but the court of appeals upheld
21 4
the order.
The supreme court, however, agreed in part with Linehan. 1 5 In
the majority's opinion, the evidence did not support the trial court's
finding that
Linehan was completely unable to control his sexual
2 16
impulses.
First, none of the expert witnesses who had examined Linehan were
asked whether they believed he met Pearson's three criteria. 1 v
Instead, only the statutory definition was invoked in the proceed* 218
ings.
Second, the two doctors who testified in favor of commitment differed as to whether Linehan could control his behavior.1 9
Nonetheless, the trial court expressly found that Linehan met the
Pearson standard, concluding that his conduct "shows an utter lack of
power and ability to control his sexual impulses" (the second element
of Pearson) and that he "continues to be dangerous to others by sexual

213.

Id. at 610. After the petition for commitment had been filed, Linehan was

paroled to MSH, where he remained throughout the commitment and appeal process.
Id. at 611.
214. In re Linehan, 503 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
215. Linehan, 518 N.W.2d at 613.
216. Id. at 613-14.
217. Id. at 613. At the first hearing, the two doctors who recommended commitment based their opinions on the statutory definition. Id. at 612. Of the two doctors
who did not support the petition for commitment, one felt that Linehan "did not meet
the definition of psychopathic personality." Id. The other doctor-who was well-versed
in the statutory definition and the Pearsonstandard, but who apparently made no direct
reference to either in his testimony-felt that Linehan did not pose a danger to the
public. Id. Quoting the statutory language but not the Pearson criteria, the trial court
based its 60-day provisional commitment of Linehan upon the testimony of the two
doctors who recommended commitment. Id. at 612-13.
At the second commitment hearing, two of the same four doctors testified (one
favoring and one opposing commitment) and gave substantially the same testimony.
Id. at 613. In addition, Linehan's treating psychiatrist from MSH testified that while
Linehan had made satisfactory progress, he still was highly likely to be a repeat offender
absent treatment and supervision. Id. The MSH treatment team's report stated that
Linehan "ha[d] made no significant change or progress in his behavior since his
admission" and declined to "predict any future dangerous acts ... due to limited
experience with him." Id. Once again, the testifying experts were not asked whether
they believed Linehan met the Pearson criteria. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. While both doctors described Linehan's behavior as controlled, one opined
that Linehan was "extremely impulsive" when using alcohol. Id. On this point, the
supreme court noted again that Linehan appears to have his alcohol abuse under
control. Id.; see also supra note 212 (discussing the court's reference to Linehan's
chemical dependency treatment).
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attack."220
The supreme court sharply disagreed with the trial court's method
of analysis:
It is not enough.., for the trial court to use [the Pearson] language
in a conclusory fashion when the expert testimony upon which it
relies has been given in terms of the statutory definition. Neither the
testimony of Dr. Friberg and Dr. Zeller [the two doctors favoring
commitment] nor appellant's behavior while incarcerated supports
the finding of uncontrollability. There is, therefore, no clear and
has an utter lack of power to
convincing evidence that appellant
21
control his sexual impulses.
The court held that the county had not proven the "utter lack of
2 22
control" element of the Pearson test.
The court declined to analyze whether the county had borne its
burden in proving that Linehan was likely to engage again in dangerous behavior, since " [d] angerousness in the context of the Psychopathic Personality Statute is predicated on an utter lack of ability to control
sexual impulses." 22' However, the court laid out a set of factors to
be considered by trial courts in evaluating a person's propensity for
dangerous behavior.224 The court suggested that trial courts consider
the individual's "relevant demographic characteristics," her or his
history of violent behavior, the "base rate statistics for violent behavior
among individuals of this person's background," the person's exposure
and likely response to stress, "the similarity of the present or future
context" to situations in which the person has been violent, and his or
her success (or lack thereof) in sex offender treatment programs.225
The court indicated it would look for such an analysis when reviewing
future psychopathic personality cases, particularly when a significant
period of time had elapsed between
the individual's last offense and
26
the petition for commitment.

220. Linehan, 518 N.W.2d at 613.
221. Id. at 614.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing State ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn.
545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939)).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. In her dissent, Justice M. Jeanne Coyne strongly objected to the use of
"base rate statistics" in evaluating a person's potential for future violent behavior:
It is the habitual course of criminal sexual conduct revealed by the record of
the person in question which provides a basis for predicting serious danger
to the public, not the course of misconduct committed by other persons. Not

only are the statistics concerning the violent behavior of others irrelevant, but
it seems to me wrong to confine any person on the basis not of that person's
own prior conduct but on the basis of statistical evidence regarding the

behavior of other people.
Id. at 616.
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Linehan's commitment as a psychopathic personality was thereby
vacated.227 On August 16, 1994, he was released from the Minnesota
Security Hospital and placed under heavy guard and electronic
surveillance in an old staff residence on the grounds of a Minnesota
state prison.228

III. THE

LEGISLATURE REACTS:

THE NEW STATUTE

A.

The New Statute
In the wake of the Linehan decision and the resulting public outcry,
the Minnesota Legislature jumped aboard a bandwagon of states
seeking to quell sexual violence via a new form of civil commitment. 22 1 On August 31, 1994, the legislature convened in special

227. Id. at 614.
228. Wangstad, supra note 210, at Al. The Department of Corrections could detain
Linehan because his parole does not expire until August 1997. Paul Gustafson &
Robert Whereatt, Rapist/Murderer Wins Release-And Tight Surveillance, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Aug. 16, 1994, at Al.
229. In 1990, Washington became the first state to enact a modem sex offender
commitment statute, the "sexually violent predator" statute. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.09.010-.230 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). Since then, at least five states (in addition
to Minnesota) have enacted statutes with similar aims, i.e., utilizing the civil commitment process to divert sex offenders who are due to be released from prison into
mental health facilities. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4601 to -4609 (Supp.
1995) (effectiveJuly 1, 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6608 (West Supp. 1996)
(effectiveJan. 1, 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a15 (1994) (effective May 19,
1994); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.4 (West Supp. 1995) (effective Oct. 31, 1994); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01-.13 (West Supp. 1995) (effective June 2, 1994). Legislators in
many other states also have tried-thus far without success-to pass like legislation. See,
e.g., H.R. 171, Ala. Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (1994); H.R. 33, 19th Alaska Leg., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R. 5642, Conn. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995); H.R. 619, 137th Del. Gen.
Assembly, 1993-94 Sess. (1994); H.R. 2069, 13th Fla. Leg., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 1010,
18th Haw. Leg. (1995); H.R. 1602, La. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995); H.R. 5245, 88th Mich.
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995); H.S. 114, Miss. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995); S. 547, 88th Mo. Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (1996); L. 775, 94th Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 192, Nev. Leg.,
68th Sess. (1995) (enacted, but provision for civil commitment of "sexually violent
predators" was deleted from final version; see Act of June 16, 1995, ch. 256, 1995 Nev.
Stat. 192); S. 2734, 218th N.Y. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 396, 120th Ohio
Gen. Assembly, 1993-94 Sess. (1993); H.R. 3218, 67th Or. Leg. Assembly (1993); S.
1873, 178th Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994); H.R. 8350, R.I. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1994); H.R. 3193, S.C. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993); H.R. 306, 51st Utah Leg. (1995);
S. 9, Vt. Leg., Biennial Sess. (1995).
Although the Washington Supreme Court upheld that state's "sexually violent
predator" statute, In reYoung, 857 P.2d 989, 1018 (Wash. 1993), a federaljudge recently
declared it unconstitutional and granted a writ of habeas corpus to an individual who
had been committed pursuant to the law, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 754 (W.D.
Wash. 1995). In addition, although declared unconstitutional by several trial court
judges, Wisconsin's "sexually violent person" statute recently was upheld by the state
supreme court. See State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Wis. 1995) (holding that
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session, called by Governor Arne Carlson, to consider a bill that would
substantially strengthen prosecutors' power to commit convicted sex
offenders.2 '
Given the difficulty in proving that an individual
"utter[ly] lack[s] ... power to control [his or her] sexual impulses,"231 as evidenced in Linehan,5 2 the legislature sought to create
a broader category under which sex offenders could be civilly committed. 3 3
While essentially retaining the definition and procedures for
commitment of a psychopathic personality (now characterized as a
"sexual psychopathic personality") ,2 the legislature also created a

Chapter 980, Wisconsin Statutes, does not violate the Ex Post Facto or Double jeopardy
Clauses of the state and federal constitutions); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Wis.
1995) (holding that the statute does not violate state or federal constitutional
guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection).
230. GOVERNOR ARNE H. CARLSON, PROCLAMATION FOR SPECIAL SESSION 1994,
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH SESSION AND 1994 SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, at 8821 (1994). In addition to the

substantive changes discussed in the text, see infra notes 234-39 and accompanying text,
the legislature repealed the existing psychopathic personality provisions, MINN. STAT.
§§ 526.09-.115 (1992), and incorporated them as amended into the civil commitment
act as a whole, MINN. STAT. ch. 253B (1994).
The legislature also amended the statute that requires convicted sex offenders to
register their whereabouts for a 10-year period with a designated corrections agent. See
MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1994). The statute was revised to toll that 10-year period during
the time an offender is committed pursuant to Minnesota Statutes Section 253B.185 as
a sexual psychopathic personality or sexually dangerous person. Act of Aug. 31, 1994,
ch. 1, art. 3, § 2, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 31 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 243.166,
subd. 6(a) (1994)).
231. The "utter lack of power to control" is the second prong of the Pearson
standard. See supra text accompanying note 34.
232. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994); see also supra notes 216-22
and accompanying text (discussing evidence of Linehan's control over his sexual
impulses).
233. See Gustafson & Whereatt, supra note 228, at Al (describing state attorney
general's proposal to revise the psychopathic personality statute so as to exclude
Pearson's "utter lack of control" requirement).
234. The legislature recast the "psychopathic personality" as a "sexual psychopathic
personality," incorporating the original statutory definition and the Pearsonstandard as
follows:
"Sexual psychopathic personality" means the existence in any person of such
conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of
customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of these conditions, which
render the person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual
matters, if the person has evidenced, by a habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control the person's sexual impulses
and, as a result, is dangerous to other persons.
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 23, 34
(stating, respectively, the original statutory definition and the Pearson construction).
The legislature made no substantive changes to the procedures governing the
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second category, the "sexually dangerous person," as a target for civil
commitment.2 15 A "sexually dangerous person" is one who "(1) has
engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct ...;26 (2) has
manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual
conduct ... .,,2"7Thus, the legislature deliberately repudiated the
second Pearson criterion,s stating outright that proof of utter
inability to control one's sexual impulses is not required for the
commitment of a "sexually dangerous person. "239
The legislature passed the bill in short order,2' and the governor
signed it the same242day.241 Hours later, on September 1, 1994, the
statute took effect.
B.

The First Challenge: Linehan Again

Allowing no moss to grow on the new law, the Ramsey County
Attorney filed a petition on September 2, 1994, to commit Dennis
Linehan as a "sexually dangerous person" under the new statute.243
Linehan moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the statute
violates substantive due process and equal protection under the federal
and state constitutions; that it is void for vagueness; and that it is
substantively a criminal law that violates constitutional safeguards
against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, bills of attainder, and

commitment of sexual psychopathic personalities, and the same provisions apply to
sexually dangerous persons. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (1994); see also supra
part II.C.2. (describing commitment procedures).
235. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (1994).
236. The statute defines "harmful sexual conduct" as that which "creates a
substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another." Id. subd.
7a(a). Criminal sexual conduct of the first through fourth degrees creates a rebuttable
presumption of harmful sexual conduct. Id. subd. 7a(b). A presumption also is created
by a number of felonies (from murder to tampering with a witness), "[i]f the
[felonious] conduct was motivated by the person's sexual impulses or was part of a
pattern of behavior that had criminal sexual conduct as a goal." Id.
237. Id. subd. 18b(a).
238. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
239. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(b) (1994) ("For purposes of this provision,
it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person's
sexual impulses.").
240. INTRODUCTION AND FIRST READING OF HOUSE BILLS, MESSAGES FROM THE
SENATE, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH SESSION AND 1994 SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, at 8823-24 (1994).

241.

GOVERNOR ARNE H. CARLSON, PETITIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS, JOURNAL OF

THE HOUSE OF THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH SESSION AND

1994 SPECIAL SESSION

OF THE

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, at 8826 (1994).
242. Act of Aug. 31, 1994, ch. 1,art. 1, § 7, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 9.
243. Gustafson, supra note 208, at B1.
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procedural inadequacies. 2" The trial judge rejected these contentions, concluding that the sexually dangerous persons statute "strikes
a delicate balance between245the safety of the public and the liberty
interests of the individual."
In reaching its decision, the court noted the fundamental difference
between commitment as a "sexually dangerous person" and that as a
"sexual psychopathic personality": While a sexual psychopathic
personality must utterly lack the power to control his or her sexual
impulses, a sexually dangerous person must have "manifested a sexual,
personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction" to be committed.2 46 The judge acknowledged that this aspect of the sexually
admittedly broader" than the psychodangerous persons measure "is
pathic personality provision and, therefore, the constitutionality of the
new statute was likely to be attacked.247
1. Substantive Due Process
Linehan first argued that the new sexually dangerous persons statute
violated his right to substantive due process under the federal and state
constitutions. 2' Linehan maintained that he did not fit any of the
"carefully limited exceptions" enumerated in Foucha2 49 and thus
250
could not be deprived of his liberty.
The trial judge agreed that Linehan did not fall within two of the
categories outlined in Foucha.2 1' However, the court concluded that
the diagnoses of Linehan's conditions, as outlined in the petition for

244. In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0382, slip op. at 2-3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 27, 1994)

(order denying motion to dismiss petition for commitment).
245. Id. at 22.
246. Id. at 3-4 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a) (2) (1994)). The other
two elements of proof, a history of sexual misconduct and a likelihood of future
dangerous conduct, are essentially equivalent for commitment as either a sexual psychopathic personality or a sexually dangerous person. Id. at 4; see also supra notes 234-37
and accompanying text (providing current statutory definitions of "sexual psychopathic
personality" and "sexually dangerous person").
247. Lirehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 4.
248. Id. at 5.
249. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (listing circumstances under which
a state may exercise its police power to confine an individual).
250. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 6-7.
251. Id. Because Linehan had completed his sentences and would not be subject
to "limited confinement" as a sexually dangerous person, the trial judge found that
Linehan's situation was not analogous to two of the three listed exceptions (namely,
"imprisonment ...for the purpose[s] of deterrence and retribution" and "limited
confinement.., of persons who pose a danger to others or to the community"). Id.;
see also supra note 142 and accompanying text (enumerating the three limited
exceptions outlined in Foucha).
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commitment, 252 would be sufficient to establish a "mental disorder
come within the scope of the second
or dysfunction, "253 which would
254
exception specified in Foucha.
The court reached this conclusion in two steps. First, the holding
of Foucha 55 would control only if Linehan were petitioning for
release from commitment as a sexually dangerous person and if he had
shown that one of the three elements required for commitment was no
longer applicable. 56 Second, the court considered itself bound by
the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of Foucha, where it
found that the psychopathic personality was merely a "sub-set" of the
"mentally ill and dangerous" category. 257 Because, in the view of the
trial judge, the supreme court found that the "utter lack of power"
prong of the psychopathic personality test "could constitutionally be
included in the Foucha category of mental illness," the judge reasoned
that the second element of the sexually dangerous persons test could
Therefore, a "disorder or dysfunction,2 59 such as
as well.258
Linehan's alleged antisocial personality disorder, would provide a
ill
constitutionally sufficient basis to confine an individual as "mentally
2
and dangerous" under the exceptions specified in Foucha

252. Psychologists' reports appended to the petition alleged that Linehan has an
antisocial personality disorder, accompanied by pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism,
and chemical dependency. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 7.
253. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a) (2) (1994).
254. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 7-9. Under the second exception articulated in
Foucha, a state may, under certain circumstances, exercise its police power to confine
individuals, including those who are shown by clear and convincing evidence to be
mentally ill and dangerous. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
255. See supra part II.D.
256. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 8. The court based its interpretation on the fact
that Foucha had been committed as a mentally ill and dangerous person, and he was
no longer mentally ill when he petitioned for release. Id. at 7. But see infra notes 31415 and accompanying text (describing recent decision in which the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a psychopathic personality could not be released merely because he no
longer met one of the statutory criteria under which he was committed).
257. See Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 8 (citing In re Blodgett's analysis of the three
categories of permissible detainment delineated in Foucha).
258. Id. at 8-9. Moreover, the trial court cited a Washington Supreme Court case
for the proposition that the United States Supreme Court uses the terms "mentally ill"
and "mentally disordered" interchangeably. Id. at 9 (citing In re Young, 857 P.2d 989,
1001 n.3 (Wash. 1993) (upholding the constitutionality of that state's sexually violent
predator civil commitment law)).
259. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(2) (1994).
260. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 12; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text
(listing exceptions identified in Foucha). In a lengthy conclusion to its analysis of the
due process issue, the Linehan court interpreted the third factor of the sexually
dangerous persons standard, the likelihood of engaging in acts of harmful sexual
conduct, as requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence. See Linehan, No. P8-940382 at 10-12. "[Pletitioner will be required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence
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2. Equal Protection
Linehan also argued that the sexually dangerous persons statute
violated equal protection under the federal and state constitutions on
two grounds.2"6' First, he contended that sexually dangerous persons
262
and mentally ill and dangerous persons are treated disparately.
Second, Linehan maintained that the statute effectively discriminates
against those sex offenders who have2 a63 "disorder or dysfunction," as
opposed to sex offenders who do not.
Linehan based his first argument on the fact that commitment of a
mentally ill and dangerous person must be predicated upon proof of
.a substantial likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of
inflicting serious physical harm on another."264 The court compared
the "substantial likelihood" standard with the sexually dangerous
persons standard of "likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual
conduct"2' 6 and concluded that the standard of proof is "identical.
Linehan also contended that a mentally ill and dangerous person
can petition for release if he or she is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous, while a sexually dangerous person seeking release is held
to a higher standard.267 Citing Foucha, the court rejected this argument, stating that if any one of the three requirements were no longer
applicable, a person committed as sexually dangerous necessarily would
have to be released, just as a mentally ill and dangerous person would
be if she or he were no longer mentally ill or dangerous.26
The crux of Linehan's second equal protection argument was that
sex offenders who have a "disorder or dysfunction" are subject to
harsher treatment than those sex offenders who do not.269 The court
rejected Linehan's contention that both groups are equally dangerous

[that] it is highly probable that Respondent will engage in the future in acts of
harmful sexual conduct as defined in [the statute]." Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
The second Minnesota district court to address the new statute's constitutionality
has followed Linehan's lead, holding that the statute's "likely to" language requires a
showing that the respondent is "highly probable" or "substantial[ly] likel[y]" to engage
in future harmful conduct. In re Schweninger, No. P4-94-35292, slip op. at 16 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. filed May 30, 1995).
261. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 12.
262. Id.
263. See id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(2) (1994)).
264. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (1994); Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 13.
265. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
266. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 13.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)).
269. Id. at 14.
...
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to society:
The problem with [Linehan's] argument is that the Legislature did
not see it that way. The Legislature apparently felt that those
offenders who have a disorder do in fact pose a greater threat of
sexual violence than those who do not. The prediction of future
violence is not an act [of] science. ... The Legislature evidently
decided that since personality disorders are marked by enduring
patterns of behavior, often of stable and long duration, persons with
such disorders should
be treated differently than persons without
2 70
these characteristics.
The court concluded that the sexually dangerous persons statute does
not offend equal
protection under the United States or Minnesota
27
Constitutions. '
3.

Fourteenth Amendment

Linehan next attacked the statute as being unconstitutionally
vague. 72 But the court found that the definition of the phrase
"sexually dangerous person" was "relatively precise" and that the term
"disorder" had a definite meaning in the mental health field.273
Furthermore, the court construed the statutory definition's last
component so as to require the state to show that it was "highly
probable" the respondent would engage in future harmful sexual conduct. 274 In short order, the court concluded that the statute was "not
2 75
so uncertain and indefinite" as to obfuscate legislative intent.
4.

Ex Post Facto, DoubleJeopardy, and Bills of Attainder

Contending that the sexually dangerous persons statute is essentially
a criminal measure, Linehan asserted that the statute violates constitutional protections against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, and bills
276
of attainder.
The court summarily dispensed with these argu2 77
ments.
First, the court determined that the sexually dangerous persons
statute is essentially civil in nature. 278 It applied a two-step analy-

270. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 15.
273. Id. The court dismissed Linehan's argument regarding the word "dysfunction"
as irrelevant, since he is alleged to suffer from a personality disorder. Id. at 16.
274. Id.; see also supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (stating statutory
definition of "sexually dangerous person").
275. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 15-16 (drawing the standard of review from In re
Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d 638, 646 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)).
276. Id. at 16-17.
277. Id. at 16-21.
278. Id. at 20.
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sis 279 to conclude that the legislature clearly intended that the
commitment be a civil proceeding 2 ° and the actual effect of the
statute is civil, not criminal.28' Second, since protections against ex
282
post facto laws and double jeopardy relate only to criminal matters,
the 283
court concluded that Linehan's claims as to these issues must
fail.
As to the assertion that the statute constitutes a bill of attainder, the
court cited precedent defining a bill of attainder as "a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial." 284 Because the
sexually dangerous persons act provides for a judicial proceeding, the
court ruled that this last argument, like all those preceding, was
without merit.

2 85

Thus, the new statute was upheld against Linehan's challenge. On
July 27, 1995, the court declared Linehan to be a "sexually dangerous
person" and ordered him committed to MSH. 86 Linehan appealed,

279. The court applied the analysis suggested by United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
248 (1980).
280. Linehan, No. P8-94-0382 at 17. The court relied on the statute's tide ("An act
relating to civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons... " Act of Aug. 31, 1994,
ch. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5 (emphasis added)). Id.
281. Id. at 20. The court considered several factors in reaching its conclusion. First,
it observed that Minnesota's original psychopathic personality statute was upheld as a
civil measure by the United States Supreme Court, id.at 18 (citing Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940)), and that the
Minnesota Supreme Court had expressly rejected the contention that the statute was
"criminal in nature," id.(quoting Minnesota v. Enebak, 272 N.W.2d 27, 30 (1978)).
The court also alluded to Blodget in which Minnesota's high court expressly found the
statute to have a rehabilitative, rather than punitive, purpose. Id. (citing In re Blodgett,
510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (1994)).
Second, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court has construed
another "sexually dangerous persons" commitment statute as civil in nature. Id. at 18-19
(citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1986)). In Alien, the Court based its
conclusion on the fact that the statute mandated treatment in a psychiatric facility,
provided for discharge under specified circumstances, and did not further the
"traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence." Id. at 19 (quoting Allen,
478 U.S. at 370). Because the sexually dangerous persons act provides for treatment
and procedures for release, the court concluded that the statute advances the civil
objectives of incapacitation and treatment, rather than criminal, punitive ends. Id. at
19-20.
282. Id. at 20-21 (citing Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 388, 71 N.W.2d 869,
880 (1955) (interpreting Ex Post Facto Clause to apply only to criminal matters);
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply unless both proceedings are criminal in nature)).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 21 (quoting Starkweather 245 Minn. at 376, 71 N.W.2d at 874).
285. Id.
286. In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0382, slip op. at 2-3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed July 27,
1995) (order for judgment). In considering whether Linehan was likely to engage in
future acts of harmful sexual conduct, the court found that Linehan's completion of sex
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and the Minnesota Court of Appeals is expected to issue its decision
in February 1996.27 Regardless of the outcome, appeals to the
Minnesota and United States Supreme Courts seem inevitable.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Two justifications commonly are advanced for a state's power to
detain sex offenders under civil commitment statutes. A state may act
pursuant to its parens patriae interest in protecting those who are
unable to protect themselves, or a state may exercise its police power
to protect the public from violence or other evils."'8 While the
psychopathic personality statute appears to have been enacted and
initially interpreted with the "protection" and treatment of the
individual miscreant in mind,"8 9 Minnesota's courts and legislature
290
clearly have shifted their emphasis to the protection of the public.
A.

The Parens Patriae Rationale
Assuming arguendo that the sexual psychopathic personality and
sexually dangerous persons statute is intended to assure treatment for
individuals who are committed thereunder, one cannot ignore the fact
that most mental health professionals regard these persons as untreatable. 29' For example, the Minnesota Psychiatric Society and the
staff of the Minnesota Security Hospital have opposed psychopathic
personality commitments on the ground that most of these individuals

offender and chemical dependency treatment programs, as well as his age, militated in
his favor. Id. at 26. However, the court concluded that these factors were outweighed
by Linehan's past record, current behavior, and diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder. Id.
287. In re Linehan, No. C1-95-2022 (Minn. Ct. App. filed Sept. 20, 1995).
288. Reome v. Levine, 692 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Minn. 1988); see also supra note
50.
289. See supra part II.A-C.
290. See supra parts II.G-III.A.
291. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 38. But see W.L. Marshall &
W.D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment Outcome with Sex Offenders, 21 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 10-11 (1994) (expressing cautious optimism regarding recent reports that
indicate some success with cognitive-behaviorally-based treatment including relapse
prevention components). Marshall and Pithers note one of the key difficulties in
assessing the effectiveness of treatment: the ethical dilemma and methodological
difficulties that arise when those who volunteer to be research subjects are split at
random into two groups, those receiving treatment and those not receiving treatment
(the control group). Id. at 23-24. Withholding treatment from the control group may
adversely affect (1) the untreated sex offenders, because they likely will not win release
as early as if they had been treated; (2) society as a whole, because untreated sex
offenders may attack again; and (3) the research itself, because the delay in release of
untreated offenders will render comparisons between the treated and untreated groups
unreliable. Id.
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do not
have a diagnosable mental illness and are treatment-resis292
tant.

The terms "sexual psychopathic personality" and "sexually dangerous
person" have no foundation in the mental health profession's current
lexicon. 2" Those who have been or are likely to be committed
under either category suffer from no common mental illness or
disorder. ' For example, some psychopathic personalities have been
clinically diagnosed as pedophiles or sexual sadists, while others are
classified as having antisocial personality disorders or unspecified
personality disorders. 2 ' Likewise, one study showed that nineteen
percent of a group of sex offenders produced a "normal" profile on
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. 96 Some researchers also have suggested that motivations for committing rape differ
widely, and they distinguish between sexual and nonsexual "subtypes"
of offenders.2 97 It is reasonable to assume that those committed as

292. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 9; see also Erickson, supranote
13, at 1-3; MINNESOTA PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY, PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY STATUTE 1-3 (1992). A report issued by the Minnesota Department of
Corrections concurs: "Individuals who have been found to be psychopathic are those
who are least likely to benefit from treatment." WOOD, supra note 71, at 4.
293. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
Widely used by mental health
professionals, the manual provides diagnostic criteria and classifications of mental
disorders "reflect[ing] a consensus of current formulations of evolving knowledge in
[the mental health] field." Id. at xxvii. "Psychopathic personality" is not listed as a
classification, nor are any of the manual's classifications comparable to the definition
provided by the statute or the Pearson construction. See id. at 493-538. The manual
states, "Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that
are primarily between the individual and society are mental disorders unless the
deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual . .. ." Id. at xxii.
294. See LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 16-17; see also PROGRAM
EVALUATION Div., OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT PROGRAMS 31-32 (1994) ("[E]mpirical research.., has found considerable
variation among rapists and significant differences between rapists and child
molesters.").
295. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 16-17.

296. Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, The AUeged Child Victim and Real Victims
of Sexual Misuse, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SEXOLOGY: BIOMEDICAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 223, 246 (James J. Krivacska & John Money eds., 1994) (citing W.D.

Erickson et al., Frequency of MMPI Two-Point Code Types Among Sex Offenders, 55 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 566, 566-70 (1987)).
297. Howard E. Barbaree et al., Comparisons Between Sexual and Nonsexual Rapist

Subtypes: Sexual Arousal to Rape, OffensePrecursors,and Offense Characteristics,21 CRIM.JUST.
& BEHAV. 95, 98 (1994). A typology developed at the Massachusetts Treatment Center

includes nine different subtypes separated on the basis of [sex offenders']
inferred motivation for raping and their social competence. As it happens,
these subtypes also differ in their levels of criminality and impulsivity. The
subtypes can be broadly divided into those in which sexual motivation for
rape is primary (the sexual subtypes) and those in which the motivation for
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"sexually dangerous persons" also will embody a wide range of
diagnoses and classifications.
Although the Minnesota Security Hospital offers sex offenders a
four-phase treatment program that takes at least three years to
complete, 298 data show that the vast majority of individuals recently
committed as psychopathic personalities already had either refused
treatment or failed to complete it prior to their commitments.2
Given the slim probability that either sexual psychopathic personalities
or sexually dangerous persons will benefit from treatment, the parens
patriaejustification for the statute seems disingenuous at best.
The rationale becomes even more precarious when one considers
the costs of civil commitment versus incarceration. In fiscal 1995,
detaining one convicted sex offender at MSH will cost an estimated
$216 per day, while the per-patient expense at the new Moose Lake
treatment facility will be approximately $277 per day."°° In contrast,
each offender incarcerated in the state's most secure prison will cost
the taxpayers about $114 per day, a figure that includes the expense
of sex offender treatment programs provided to inmates.3 0 '
No compelling justification has been advanced for indefinitely
confining individuals, who are generally thought to be untreatable, in
the vain hope that someday they will complete treatment successfully.
Until effective methods of treatment are found, civil commitment of
sex offenders simply serves as a means of warehousing "people who are
what they are. "302
B.

The Police Power Rationale
The decision to commit a sexual psychopathic personality or a
sexually dangerous person is predicated primarily upon the individual's
past history of violence and predictions of his or her potential for
future dangerous conduct.303

The existence and atrocity of these

rape is aggression, hostility, or a callous disregard for the feelings of the
victim (the nonsexual subtypes).
Id. Barbaree et al. conclude that "[s]uch diversity in the characteristics of the act of
rape, and in the history and characteristics of men who commit rape, defies any single
explanation.... Future research is needed to elaborate on the heterogeneity of this
population and the diversity of processes leading to rape." Id. at 113.
298. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 23.
299. Id. at 17. Other psychopathic personalities were not allowed to participate in
treatment because of safety concerns. Id.
300. Id. at 31.
301. Id. at 30-31. The difference in cost largely is attributable to staff/inmate ratios.
Id. at 31.
302. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 146
(1994).
303. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
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individuals' criminal histories are undeniable. Yet, as sex offenders
serve increasingly lengthy sentences, their past violent acts will become
more remote and, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
necessarily must be given less weight when courts consider
petitions for
3°
their commitment or release from commitment. '
The state supreme court has suggested that even if there is no parens
patriaejustification for the civil commitment of sex offenders, the
strong interest in public safety justifies the exercise of the state's police
power.30 5 Because the concern for public safety is rooted exclusively
in the desire to avoid future harmful conduct, exercise of the police
power in the commitment of sexual psychopathic personalities and
sexually dangerous persons is inextricably linked to predictions of

future "dangerousness" or "harmful sexual conduct." In both types of
commitment proceedings, therefore, the fundamental question will be
whether the individual poses a risk of future harm to the public.
Mental health professionals' predictions of an individual's potential
for dangerousness usually are based upon data from two sources:
actuarial tables and, more frequently, clinical evaluations of the
individuals themselves.0 6 But regardless of their bases, such prognostications are notoriously unreliable:
[T] he "best" clinical research currently in existence indicates that
psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out
of three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period
among institutionalized populations that had both committed
violence in the past (and thus had high base rates for it) and who

304.

See In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994) (noting that the recency

of an individual's violent behavior is relevant to a court's analysis of whether he or she
poses a future threat to the public). But cf In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0382, slip op. at
7-9, 17 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed July 27, 1995) (order for judgment):
It is true that the last of [Linehan's] criminal acts occurred in 1975.
However, ... since his string of violent offenses in the 60's, [Linehan] has
had only one opportunity to commit a violent offense and he took advantage
of it by attacking [a young woman]. I have considered the fact that 20 years
have elapsed since his last violent sexual offense, but have concluded ...that
this factor nonetheless weighs against [Linehan].
Id. at 17.
305. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 916 ("[Elven when treatment is problematic, and it
often is, the state's interest in the safety of others is no less legitimate and compelling.").
306. Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington'sSexually Violent PredatorLaw: The Need to Bar
UnreliablePsychiatricPredictionsofDangerousnessfrom Civil Commitment Proceedings,39 UCLA
L. REv. 213, 224 (1991). The reliance upon examination of the individual is due to the
fact that actuarial data are not well-developed at this time. Id. Moreover, compelling
arguments have been asserted against using statistical evidence as the basis for
predicting an individual's propensity for violence, particularly when the outcome may
be indefinite detention. See, e.g., supra note 226 (quoting Justice Coyne's dissent in
Linehan).
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30 7
were diagnosed as mentally ill.
While perhaps putting a name to behavior that most people find
incomprehensible, official diagnoses are based solely on an individual's
past acts and do not provide an objective basis for predicting future
conduct. 08
Without a doubt, our justice system sometimes relies on predictions
of dangerousness to determine an individual's fate."° Ultimately, the
psychiatrists and psychologists who offer opinions as to individuals'
prospective dangerousness, and the judges who decide whether those
persons will be committed, base their conclusions on a question that
evokes images of Foucha: "Would I feel 'comfortable' with this person
in my neighborhood?" ' ° Given the abhorrent acts committed by
many of these individuals, most often the answer will be a resounding
31

",no., 1

The Minnesota Supreme Court has intimated that as long as the
individual can petition for release, the post-sentence civil commitment

307.

JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR

47-49

(1981)).
Between 1979 and 1993, only one study was published that measured
clinicians' accuracy in predicting violence in the community. Monahan & Steadman,
supra note 14, at 5. In that study, only 39 percent of those rated as having a medium
to high likelihood of being dangerous to others actually committed "dangerous acts"
in the two-year period following the assessment. Id. n.1.
However, some "false positives" (i.e., those individuals who are labeled "dangerous"
but who are not shown to commit subsequent violent acts) may commit acts for which
they are never apprehended or prosecuted or acts that are never reported. Marie A.
Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington's Sexually Violent
PredatorStatute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 296 (1992). This may be particularly true in
the area of criminal sexual conduct, where a government survey reported that only 52.5
percent of all rapes (completed and attempted) are reported. BUREAU OFJUST. STAT.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUST. STATISTICS 252 (Kathleen

Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1993). Other studies show that the reporting level is
even lower. For example, a study released by the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
found that as many as 84 percent of rapes are not reported and 98 percent of the time
the attacker is not caught, tried, or imprisoned. Renee Cordes, Rape Not Treated as a
Serious Crime, Senate Report Says, TRIAL, Aug. 1993, at 86, 86.
308. Gleb, supra note 306, at 230-31 (citing Amicus Brief for the American
Psychiatric Association at 13, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080)).
309. Bochnewich, supra note 307, at 284. "'[A] jurisprudence that pretends to
exclude the role of predictions of dangerousness is self-deceptive.'" Id. (quoting Marc
Miller & Norval Morris, Predictionsof Dangerousness:Ethical Concerns and ProposedLimits,
2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 393, 395 (1986)). Bochnewich notes that
predictions of dangerousness have been found to constitute permissible bases for
imposing pretrial detention, criminal sentences (including the death penalty),
preventive detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, and the indefinite civil
commitment of insanity acquittees. Id. at 284-93.
310. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 74-75 (1992) (quoting doctor as saying he
would not "feel comfortable in certifying that [Foucha] would not be a danger").
311. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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of sex offenders is permissible."' Yet, the standards governing
discharge are as nebulous as the criteria for commitment. Foucha
suggests that to win release, a petitioner need only prove that one of
the statutory criteria under which she or he originally was committed
is no longer applicable."' This reading of Foucha, however, recently
was rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which held that a
person petitioning for release must meet a separate set of standards
governing discharge. 1 14 In the state court's view, an individual cannot win release simply by showing that he or she no longer meets one
of the statutory criteria under which she or he was committed.1 5
Regardless of which set of criteria is applied, the task of winning
release is onerous. Under either the commitment or discharge
standard, the individual must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he or she is no longer dangerous. Since the initial
prediction of an individual's propensity for dangerous behavior is
speculative at best," 6 the party petitioning for discharge must
disprove the opinions of the judge and mental health professionals.
This difficulty is reflected in the fact that despite the recent increase
in psychopathic personality commitments"' 7-and a corresponding
increase in petitions for discharge-only a few individuals have been
released since 1991.318

312. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146
(1994).
313. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
314. Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 318 (Minn. 1995); see also supra notes 114-15
and accompanying text (explaining statutory discharge criteria).
315. Call, 535 N.W.2d at 319. The Call court stated:
So long as the statutory discharge criteria are applied in such a way that
the person subject to commitment as a psychopathic personality is confined
for only so long as he or she continues both to need further inpatient
treatment and supervision for his [or her] sexual disorder and to pose a
danger to the public, continued commitment is justified because the
confinement bears a reasonable relation to the original reason for commitment. We believe that the statutory discharge criteria set forth in section
253B.18, subd. 15, can be applied to meet these requirements.
...
[I]t is ... not sufficient that the person no longer evinces the utter
lack of control over his [or her] sexual impulses. The utter lack of control
over one[']s sexual impulses is part of the threshold showing that must be
met tojustify commitment. Confinement may continue without meeting this
threshold if the confinement still bears the reasonable relation to the original
reason for commitment; that is, the person continues to need treatment for
his [or her] sexual disorder and continues to pose a danger to the public ....
Id.
316. See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
317. See supra part II.C.1.
318. According to a February 1994 report, only two individuals committed as
psychopathic personalities had been discharged in the preceding three years, and one
of them was provisionally discharged to a nursing home. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR'S
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Those who are committed under the new "sexually dangerous
persons" provision are likely to encounter even greater difficulty when
petitioning for discharge. Even under the more liberal reading of
Foucha,19 the person cannot refute that she or he has a history of
harmful sexual conduct, nor, more notably, that he or she "has
manifested a sexual, personality or other mental disorder or dysfunction."120 Under the statute's plain language, one cannot even rely on
the fact that one's mental disorder is "cured" or in remission.32'
Therefore, the sexually dangerous person may win discharge only if he
or she can prove that she or 22he is no longer "likely to engage in acts
of harmful sexual conduct."
Under the heightened (perhaps strict) scrutiny applied in Foucha,
equal protection is violated by a statute that authorizes the indefinite
commitment of individuals on the basis of mental disorder and
dangerousness, if others, who have manifested the same type of
disorder(s) and propensities for dangerous behavior, are not subject
to such confinement.3 23 The Minnesota Supreme Court has failed
to articulate "a particularly convincing reason" 24 that justifies the
civil commitment of convicted sex offenders while other violent felons,
probably just as "likely to engage in acts of harmful [violent] conduct,"3 25 go free. The mere assertion "that the sexual predator poses
a danger that is unlike any other,"3 26 absent some supporting qualita-

supra note 8, at 24.
319. Under this interpretation of Foucha, the person must be released if one of the
committing criteria is absent. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
320. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(1)-(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
321. In part, the statutory definition of a "sexually dangerous person" describes a
person who "has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or
dysfunction." MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a) (2) (1994). The use of the past
tense seems to indicate that the individual's present condition is irrelevant.
322. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(3) (1994).
323. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1992). The Court stated:
The State nonetheless insists on holding [Foucha] indefinitely because he at
one time committed a criminal act and does not now prove he is not
dangerous. Louisiana law, however, does not provide for similar confinement
for other classes of persons who have committed criminal acts and who cannot
later prove they would not be dangerous. Criminals who have completed
their prison terms, or are about to do so, are an obvious and large category
of such persons. Many of them will likely suffer from the same sort of
personality disorder that Foucha exhibits. However, state law does not allow
for their continuing confinement based merely on dangerousness.
Id. at 85; accordIn reBlodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910,925 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl,J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994).
324. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86.
325. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a) (3) (1994).
326. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 917; seealsoCokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1976).
In the Supreme Court's words, "Short of homicide, [rape] is the ultimate violation of
self.... Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury ... and can also inflict
REPORT,
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tive or quantitative evidence, is inadequate to justify the indefinite-perhaps permanent-deprivation of an individual's liberty.
C. Alternatives to Civil Commitment
Our society is faced with a crisis of unforeseen and frightening
proportions. It seems as if every few weeks, another headline tells the
story of an innocent person whose life was snuffed out or brutally
altered by a convicted sex offender. Understandably, the public reacts
by demanding that such individuals never be released and, predictably,
the government hastens to respond. But the civil commitment of sex
offenders as sexual psychopathic personalities and sexually dangerous
persons serves as a mere bandage on the gaping societal wound
created by sexual violence. Future sex crimes may be averted by
proactive measures that also comport with our constitutional guarantees of liberty.
Incidents of sexual violence could be deterred in at least three ways.
First, our criminal justice system should impose longer sentences on
those who are convicted of criminal sexual conduct and other sex
offenses. Second, additional research is needed to develop effective
treatment models for sex offenders and to provide more accuracy in
predicting their potential for future violence. Third, society should
strive to prevent sexual violence by supporting programs that foster
socioeconomic stability.
As noted above, the Minnesota Legislature has taken steps in recent
years to increase the statutory maximum sentences that may be given
sex offenders, particularly repeat offenders, 27 and the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission also has acted to increase the length of
presumptive sentences for serious crimes." a Yet the presumptive
sentences for first-time offenders remain considerably lower than the
statutory maximums. For example, while the maximum sentence for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct is thirty years, an offender with a
prior conviction for the same offense is likely to receive a sentence of
time served may be reduced by up to
just 105 to 115 months,"n and
53
one-third for good behavior.'

mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the community's sense of

security, there is public injury as well." Id. at 597-98 (foomotes and internal quotation
omitted).
327. See supra notes 62-70, 82 and accompanying text.
328. SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 294, at 21. For example, the
presumptive sentence for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree doubled in 1989,
from 43 months to 86 months. Id.
329. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND COMMENTARY 41 (1992).
330. SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 294, at 18.
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Data show that of 167 individuals sentenced in 1992 for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, more than forty percent were not sentenced
to prison. 3 ' Those who were sentenced to prison received an
average sentence of ten and one-half years.3 2 And of 120 sex
offenders who had three or more prior convictions, nearly seventeen
percent served less than one year or no time whatsoever.3 3
In short, there is reason to question whether the punishments being
meted out fit the crimes being committed. This author does not
advocate requiring offenders to serve the full lengths of their prison
sentences. 3 34 Moreover, current statutory maximum sentences clearly
are adequate and should not be imposed upon every offender. An
effort should be made, however, to close the gap between statutory
maximum and presumptive sentences. Sex offenders who exhibit a
history of victimization-even if only comprised of "less serious"
sexually-motivated offenses--should serve sentences that are truly
proportionate to the atrocity of their crimes.
Second, efforts must be continued and intensified to develop more
effective methods of treating sex offenders and predicting their future
violent behavior. As noted above, too little is known about why sex
offenders commit the crimes they do, less is known about how to stop
their behavior,3 5 and still less is known about whether they will
reoffend.3 s 6 While the answers to these questions seem remote,
efforts to find them should receive the full support of government and
the public.
Finally, the most effective means of eliminating or reducing the
incidence of sexual violence may be prevention:
[T] here are no rational actions the legislature, police, courts and/or
corrections could take that would put the criminal justice system in
a position to declare to the citizenry the elimination of the possibility
of violence or homicides in our society. ...

Our attention as a

society needs to be refocused on the societal causes of an increasingly
33 7
violent society and violence towards women and children.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.

333. Id. Individuals who are not sentenced to prison may nonetheless serve up to
one year in county jails or workhouses as a condition of their probation. Id. at 16 &
n.19. The report does not make clear whether the repeat offenders' previous
convictions were for sexual assault or other offenses. See id. at 18.
334.. See WOOD, supra note 71, at 23. Wood notes the potential benefits of placing
offenders into residential programs or under intensive supervision before their
sentences are fully served. See id. Such early release allows the Department of
Corrections to impose release conditions and to monitor post-release behavior. Id.
Offenders who violate release conditions can be returned to prison. Id.
335. See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 306-11 and accompanying text.
337. WOOD, supra note 71, at 1.
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A statistical link exists between the prevalence of sexual assault and
social instability.3M Sexual violence also appears to be connected to
urbanism, unemployment, economic disparity, and the social status of
women. 3 9 Therefore, society's limited resources would be optimized
if directed toward programs encouraging greater socioeconomic
stability.
To reverse the increasing trend and propensity toward[] violence
in our society, we need to invest our resources early in the lives of
our children. Quality child care, day care and preschool programs,
early intervention with all children experiencing impulse and anger
control problems and children struggling in our education system
with learning disabilities and behavior problems must be our priority.
We must also provide equal opportunities and access for low income
and disadvantaged families to marital, family and single parent
counseling; employment; housing; health care; drug education and
prevention programs; and the identification and treatment of the
addicted. We cannot afford to continue to increase our funding of
simplistic, reactionary solutions to complex societal problems in an
effort to placate and mislead the citizens.'
Sexual violence-indeed, violence of all types-likely would become
less prevalent if society concentrated its efforts on reducing poverty
and gross economic disparities, strengthening family and neighborhood infrastructures, and redefining sex roles so as to achieve true
34
equality. '
V.

CONCLUSION

Through increased utilization of the psychopathic personality statute
and through the expansion of civil commitment to include "sexually
dangerous persons," public officials are trying desperately to atone for

338.

LARRY BARON & MURRAY A. STRAUS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN AMERICAN

SOCIETY: A STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS 145 (1989). Baron and Straus postulate that certain
factors-rates of geographical mobility, divorce, lack of religious affiliation, femaleheaded households with children, "non-familied" male households with no females
present, and the ratio of tourists to residents-are indicia of "social disorganization."
Id. at 129-30. In analyzing the prevalence of these factors in each of the 50 states, the
researchers found a correlation between high social disorganization and the rate of
rape, "which lends support to the conjecture that a high level of social disorganization
increases the risk of rape." Id. at 145. Straus and Baron noted, however, that social
disorganization may also "contribute[] indirectly to reducing rape through its
relationship with gender equality." Id. at 187.
339. Id. at 187-88. Societies in which women are assigned subservient roles are
marked by relatively high levels of violence. Id. at 187. Similarly, sexual violence is
more likely to occur in urban areas and to involve perpetrators and victims of belowaverage socioeconomic status. Id. at 188.
340. WOOD, supra note 71, at 2.
341. BARON & STRAUS, supra note 338, at 193-94.
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years of inadequate sentences for criminal sexual conduct. Unfortunately for the victims of these offenders and for the community as a
whole, the concern comes too little, too late. Decades of legislative
indifference have been followed in the past seven years by reactive,
rather than proactive, lawmaking. The tragic events of recent years
should not be exploited either to amass political capital or tojustify "a
system of wholesale
preventive detention, a concept foreign to our
42

jurisprudence."

The civil commitment of sexual psychopathic personalities and
sexually dangerous persons cannot be rationalized on parens patriae
grounds, as these individuals pose no danger to themselves and appear
highly unlikely to benefit from treatment. Nor can this system be
justified as a legitimate exercise of police power, as it rests upon
subjective forecasts of dangerousness which impermissibly infringe
upon rights of due process and equal protection.
As odious as the alternative is, we cannot permit the law to run
roughshod over constitutionally-protected liberties. The criminal
justice system-not civil commitment-should be employed to its
fullest extent to protect the public from these heinous crimes. Longer
sentences must be served, and more research into effective treatment
must be done. Perhaps most importantly, greater efforts should be
made to identify and address the social and economic causes of sexual
violence, thereby breaking its debilitating cycle.
MarnaJ Johnson

342. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994).
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